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I.  Introduction 
On July 7, 2009, Catherina Cenzon-DeCarlo (Cenzon-DeCarlo), a 
nurse for Mount Sinai Hospital (the Hospital) in New York, filed a lawsuit 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
alleging that she had been unlawfully compelled to assist in the 
performance of a late second trimester abortion over her moral and 
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religious objections.1  Mrs. Cenzon-DeCarlo alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300a-7(c) (Church Amendment)2 and requested declaratory and injunctive 
relief along with compensatory and punitive damages.3  Because the 
resolution of Cenzon-DeCarlo’s claim came on a summary judgment 
motion brought by the Hospital, ultimately affirmed by the Second Circuit, 
this Note addresses the facts as alleged in the complaint.4  The resolution of 
Cenzon-DeCarlo’s case exposes a gaping hole in the effectiveness of 
federal protections for individuals who object to participating in abortion 
procedures on religious, moral, or conscientious grounds. 
II.  The Facts of the Cenzon-DeCarlo Case 
In August of 2004, Catherina Cenzon-DeCarlo began employment at 
Mount Sinai Hospital in New York.5  During her initial interviews with the 
Hospital, Cenzon-DeCarlo was asked about her willingness to assist in 
abortions.  She responded that she had objections, based on her religious 
views, and would not be comfortable assisting in the abortion of a living 
child.6  The hiring officials did not express any concern to Cenzon-DeCarlo 
about her position on abortion.7  Indeed the hospital had a written policy 
allowing employees to formally object to assisting in abortions without 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Complaint at 11–12, 21–22, Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 
CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 169485 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (describing the facts 
surrounding the hospital’s refusal to honor Cenzon-DeCarlo’s expressed unwillingness to 
participate in abortions as well as the alleged violations of law resulting from that event). 
 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2006) ("No entity [receiving certain federal funding] 
may discriminate [against] any physician or other health care personnel . . . because he 
refused to . . . assist in the performance of [an abortion] . . . because of his religious beliefs 
or moral convictions . . . ."). 
 3. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2 (detailing Cenzon-DeCarlo’s claims including 
compensatory and punitive damages for psychological harms resulting from her participation 
as well as the request for injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the hospital from 
forcing employees to participate in abortions over their objection). 
 4. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(affirming the judgment of the district court and holding that 42 U.S.C. 300a-7(c) does not 
imply a private right of action); Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 325 (1991) 
(setting forth the standard of review for cases rising on a Rule 12(b)(6) summary judgment 
motion saying that the Court "must assume the truth of the material facts as alleged in the 
complaint"). 
 5. Complaint, supra note 1, at 5. 
 6. Id. at 6. 
 7. Id. 
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penalty.8  In keeping with this policy, Cenzon-DeCarlo filled out the form 
recording her objection.9 
Between 2004 and May of 2009, the Hospital abided by the policy and 
avoided assigning Cenzon-DeCarlo to abortion cases.10  On one occasion, 
she was assigned to an abortion case and later removed after she reminded 
her supervisors that she was only willing to assist with miscarriages.11  
During an on-call shift on May 24, 2009, Cenzon-DeCarlo was told that she 
had been assigned to a dilation and curettage (D&C) procedure which is 
commonly performed in the case of miscarriage.12  After examining the 
charts in the operation room and observing the instruments being readied, 
Cenzon-DeCarlo became concerned that the procedure scheduled was an 
abortion.13  After calling the resident assigned to the case, Cenzon-DeCarlo 
discovered that the procedure to be performed was actually a second-
trimester abortion at twenty-two weeks of gestation.14  After informing the 
resident that she would not participate in the abortion, she contacted her 
nursing supervisor and requested to be removed from the case.15  The 
supervisor instructed Cenzon-DeCarlo to find out if another nurse could 
cover for her and told her that she would contact a senior hospital official to 
ask whether she could be excused.16  When the supervisor called her back, 
Cenzon-DeCarlo was told that a senior hospital official had insisted that she 
assist in the case and had instructed the supervisor not to attempt to seek a 
replacement.17 
During her efforts to be removed from the case, Cenzon-DeCarlo was 
told by her supervisor that the mother could die if the procedure was not 
immediately performed.18  This claim contradicted the information she had 
received when speaking with the resident in charge of the case who had 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 7. 
 10. See id. at 9 (describing the Hospital’s usual practice of assigning nurses other than 
Cenzon-DeCarlo when such cases arose). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See id. at 8, 10 (describing the purposes of D&C as a common procedure to 
remove a miscarried fetus from the uterus and detailing Cenzon-DeCarlo’s receipt of her 
assignment on May 24). 
 13. Id. at 10. 
 14. Id. at 11. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 12. 
 18. Id. 
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revealed that the patient was not receiving the treatment that would be 
necessary for someone suffering critically from preeclampsia.19  
Furthermore, the case was classified as a Category II priority which 
required the surgery to be performed within a six hour window.20  This 
classification indicated that there was more than adequate time to search for 
and find a replacement nurse.21  Although it is not a requirement of the 
Church Amendment that there be other individuals willing to assist, it is 
worth noting that even the supervisor on duty was qualified and able to 
assist in the procedure and could have stepped in without causing any 
significant delay.22  Finally, the supervisor told Cenzon-DeCarlo that she 
would face charges of insubordination and patient abandonment if she 
failed to comply.23 
Realizing that such charges could cause her to lose her nursing license 
and career, Cenzon-DeCarlo made her last protest by informing her 
supervisor that her religious views led her to believe that the procedure 
amounted to "killing [] a 22-week-old child" and offered to get her priest on 
the phone to verify the sincerity of her belief.24  This offer was rejected and 
Cenzon-DeCarlo was forced to assist in and observe the performance of a 
second-trimester dilation and evacuation25 abortion described by Cenzon-
                                                                                                                 
 19. See id. (detailing Cenzon-DeCarlo’s conversation with the resident and the 
discovery that the patient was not receiving magnesium therapy which is a necessity for a 
patient in critical condition suffering from preeclampsia). 
 20. Compare id. at 14 (describing the priority given to Category II cases), with id. 
(discussing the higher priority of Category I patients "requiring immediate surgical 
intervention for life or limb threatening conditions"). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 12; see also Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, 
§ 401, 87 Stat. 91, 95–96 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006)) [hereinafter 
Church Amendment] (protecting healthcare workers from discrimination without any 
limitations as to the availability of other willing and able participants).  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 13.   
 25. See id. at 8 (describing the dilation and evacuation method of abortion).  The 
complaint set forth the details of the procedure: 
In a dilation and evacuation (D&E) abortion, the mother’s cervix is dilated, and 
after sufficient dilation the mother is placed under anesthesia or sedation.  The 
doctor then inserts grasping forceps through the mother’s cervix and into the 
uterus.  The doctor grips a part of the preborn child with the forceps and pulls it 
back through the cervix and vagina even after meeting resistance from the 
cervix.  That friction causes the preborn child to tear apart.  The process of 
evacuating the preborn child piece by piece continues until the child has been 
completely removed. 
Id. at 8. 
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DeCarlo as "the killing of a 22-week-old preborn child by 
dismemberment."26  As a part of her duties, she was required to transport 
the dismembered fetus to the specimen room.27  As a result, Cenzon-
DeCarlo experienced "extreme emotional, psychological, and spiritual 
suffering" including nightmares, loss of sleep, and damage "in her personal 
and religious relationships."28  She later had to receive treatment from her 
physician to manage the psychological harms.29  In addition, the Hospital 
drastically cut the number of her on-call assignments on which she was 
financially dependent.30 
Prior to filing suit, Cenzon-DeCarlo exhausted the Hospital’s available 
complaint procedures.  One scheduled meeting to discuss her right to refuse 
participation in abortions was cancelled by the Hospital because they 
refused to meet with her attorney present.31  On the same day the meeting 
was cancelled, Cenzon-DeCarlo was told that her ability to work future on-
call shifts depended upon her signing an agreement that she would assist in 
performing abortions that the Hospital deemed to be emergencies requiring 
her assistance.32  Even after facing intense pressure, Cenzon-DeCarlo 
refused to sign the statement and reminded the Hospital of the form she 
signed upon employment recognizing her objection to assisting in 
abortions.33 
After these events, Cenzon-DeCarlo filed suit in the Eastern District of 
New York alleging violations of the Church Amendment.34  Mount Sinai 
Hospital is subject to the provisions of the Church Amendment by virtue of 
their receipt of millions of dollars in Health and Human Services (HHS) 
grants authorized by the Public Health Service Act.35  Although the facts 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. at 14. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 15. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 5 (discussing her family’s financial dependence on her work schedule 
which, prior to the incident alleged, included eight to nine on-call shifts per month); id. at 16 
(saying that for August 2009 the number of her on-call assignments had been reduced from 
their prior levels of eight to nine down to one). 
 31. Id. at 17. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1–2. 
 35. See Church Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401(c), 87 Stat. 91, 95–96 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7) (showing that receipt of funds authorized by the Public 
Health Service Act brings the receiving entity under the anti-discrimination provisions of the 
Church Amendment); Complaint, supra note 1, at 18–19 (describing the various grants 
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concerning whether the procedure was a true emergency would likely have 
been in dispute, the Church Amendment contains no provision containing 
any sort of emergency or necessity exception.36  Cenzon-DeCarlo had, 
therefore, a persuasive case that her legally protected interests under the 
Church Amendment had been violated.  The Hospital, however, filed a 
motion to dismiss on the basis that the Church Amendment does not 
provide for a private right of action to enforce its terms.37  The District 
Court, in a decision affirmed by the Second Circuit, agreed with the 
Hospital.38  Cenzon-DeCarlo’s claim was, therefore, dismissed.39 
The resolution of Cenzon-DeCarlo’s case exposes a potential hole in 
federal statutory protections for the conscience rights of workers in the 
healthcare industry.  This gap is the product of congressional failure to 
explicitly provide for private enforcement of conscience laws combined 
with a late twentieth century shift in Supreme Court precedent that 
fundamentally altered the way federal courts consider the provision of 
remedies under federal law.40  The damaging effect of these two factors 
falls most directly on litigants, like Cenzon-DeCarlo, who seek protection 
under statutes passed just prior to the Supreme Court shift, a time when 
Congress had no reason to know that an explicit remedial provision would 
later be required by the courts.  This suggests that the courts should more 
carefully consider the propriety of implying a private remedy under statutes 
passed during this transition period rather than applying strict, formalistic 
requirements which are appropriate only for statutes passed after the courts 
abandoned the remedial approach.41  The Church Amendment, passed prior 
to this judicial departure from the remedial role, merits a more 
                                                                                                                 
received by the Hospital which trigger the applicability of the Church Amendment). 
 36. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 21 ("There is no ‘medical necessity’ exception to 
section (c) of the Church Amendment.").  See generally Church Amendment, § 401(c) 
(containing no exceptions for medical necessity or emergency). 
 37. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 
169485, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010), aff’d 626 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Defendant 
moves for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."). 
 38. See id. at *4 (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See infra notes 71–80 and accompanying text (demonstrating the shift in Court 
precedent regarding implication of private remedies under federal law). 
 41. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 
(1982) (beginning the Court’s analysis of the propriety of implying a right of action by 
saying that it is necessary to consider the state of the law at the time the statute under 
question was enacted).  
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comprehensive approach to deciding the propriety of implying a private 
right of action. 
III.  The Church Amendment 
Responding to fears that Roe v. Wade42 might be used by federal courts 
as a justification for requiring individuals and institutions to provide 
abortions against their will, Congress passed the Church Amendment which 
protects the conscience rights of workers and institutions in the healthcare 
industry.43  The Amendment reads: 
(b) The receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under 
the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers 
Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities 
Construction Act by any individual or entity does not authorize any 
court or any public official or other public authority to require— 
(1) such individual to perform or assist in the performance of 
any sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or 
assistance in the performance of such procedure or abortion would 
be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions; or 
(2) such entity to— 
(A) make its facilities available for the performance of 
any sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance of 
such procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited by 
the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral 
convictions, or 
(B) provide any personnel for the performance or 
assistance in the performance of any sterilization procedure 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–64 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy 
includes a woman’s right to obtain a pre-viability abortion). 
 43. See 119 CONG. REC. 9595 (1973) (statement of Sen. Church) ("Given this state of 
the law [resulting from Roe v. Wade], I can well understand the deep concern being 
expressed by hospital administrators, clergymen, and physicians whose religious beliefs 
prohibit abortions and/or sterilization in most cases."); Suzanne Davis & Paul Lansing, 
When Two Fundamental Rights Collide at the Pharmacy:  The Struggle to Balance 
Consumer’s Rights to Access Contraception and the Pharmacist’s Right of Conscience, 12 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 67, 76 (2009) (explaining that Congress responded to the moral 
tension surrounding Roe with the Church Amendment which "made it clear that individuals 
or entities [receiving] federal funds or assistance could not be required . . . to perform or 
assist in an abortion if contrary to religious beliefs or moral convictions"); 119 CONG. REC. at 
9595 (statement of Sen. Church) (expressing concern about the actions of a district court 
which had issued a preliminary injunction ordering a Catholic hospital to make its facilities 
available for the performance of a sterilization procedure). 
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or abortion if the performance or assistance in the 
performance of such procedures or abortion by such 
personnel would be contrary to the religious beliefs or moral 
convictions of such personnel. 
(c) No entity which receives a grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee 
under the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health 
Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities 
Construction Act after June 18, 1973, may— 
(1) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination 
of employment of any physician or other health care personnel, or 
(2) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to 
any physician or other health care personnel, 
because he performed or assisted in the performance of a lawful 
sterilization procedure or abortion, because he refused to perform or 
assist in the performance of such a procedure or abortion on the grounds 
that his performance or assistance in the performance of the procedure 
or abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral 
convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions 
respecting sterilization procedures or abortions.44 
The amendment’s protections are seen to be comprehensive.  At the 
individual level, the statute prohibits any government authority from 
requiring participation in abortion or sterilization procedures contrary to 
one’s religious or moral convictions, and it further prohibits potential 
discrimination against either participating or nonparticipating individuals 
by institutions that receive specified federal funding.45  At the entity level, 
the amendment prohibits the federal government from requiring entities that 
receive designated funds to make their facilities available for abortion or to 
provide personnel for such procedures.46 
Very little can be gleaned concerning Congress’s intended method of 
enforcement from the text of the statute alone.47  Although some suggestion 
was made in floor debate that federal funds could be withheld from 
noncompliant entities, the legislative history also contains ambiguities 
concerning enforcement.48  The Senators debating the amendment cast 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401, 87 Stat. 91, 
95–96 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2006)). 
 45. Id. § 401(b)(1), (c).  
 46. Id. § 401(b)(2). 
 47. See generally id. (making no mention of the enforcement of the Church 
Amendment’s anti-discrimination provisions). 
 48. See 119 CONG. REC. 9604 (statement of Sen. Javits) ("[I]t qualifies the benefit by 
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some doubt on the possibility of a funding penalty when Senator Javits, 
responding to the question of whether there was a penalty for violations, 
said, "I hope so.  I do not know if it will be so adjudicated by the 
administrator, but it is there."49  However, two other Senators, including 
Senator Church who sponsored the amendment, suggested that funds would 
not be withheld in the event of noncompliance.50  The Senators never made 
mention of private remedies, so very little can be gleaned from the 
legislative history to either affirm or negate the possibility of private 
enforcement.51  However, every court to consider whether this legislative 
history supports a private right of action has responded in the negative.52  
Due to the silence of Congress on the question, these findings are hardly 
surprising.  However, the District of New York, in a decision affirmed by 
the Second Circuit, ruled that the Church Amendment not only fails to 
provide a private right of action but that it does not confer individual rights 
at all.53 
IV.  The Cenzon-DeCarlo Decision 
In its examination of the propriety of implying a private right of action 
in the Church Amendment, the Eastern District of New York confined its 
inquiry to the issue of legislative intent to either create or deny a private 
remedy.54  To make this determination, the court addressed and dismissed 
                                                                                                                 
saying that if they do discriminate against the doctor who is in their hospital because he has 
done something they do not approve of . . . we have the authority to deprive them of that 
benefit."). 
 49. Id.  
 50. See id. (Statements of Senators Church and Jackson) (answering questions posed 
by Senator Pastore concerning the possibility of a penalty by suggesting that there would be 
no funding penalty in the event of noncompliance). 
 51. See Leora Eisendstadt, Separation of Church and Hospital:  Strategies to Protect 
Pro-Choice Physicians in Religiously Affiliated Hospitals, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 
160 (2003) (suggesting that the legislative history of the Church Amendment "is sparse on 
the question of congressional intent with respect to a private right of action"). 
 52. See, e.g., Nead v. Board of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454, 
at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006) (dismissing the plaintiff’s Church Amendment claim due to 
lack of support from the legislative history for implying a right of action). 
 53. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010), aff’d, 626 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2010) (saying that the 
language of the Church Amendment does not support the inference that Congress intended 
to create a private right). 
 54. See id. at *3 ("[T]his Court must examine whether Congress intended to create a 
private remedy.  If not, ‘a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no 
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the plaintiff’s argument that the Church Amendment contained the kind of 
"rights-creating language" necessary to support a finding of congressional 
intent to create a private remedy.55  The court reasoned that since that the 
statute addresses the entities regulated rather than the individuals protected, 
no private remedy was intended.56  Ultimately, the court concluded that 
neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history suggested that 
Congress intended to create a private remedy.57  The court proceeded to 
dismiss Cenzon-DeCarlo’s complaint saying that it found "no basis for 
implying a private right of action under the Church Amendment."58 
By deciding Cenzon-DeCarlo on the grounds that the Church 
Amendment did not contain the necessary rights-creating language to 
provide evidence that a right of action was intended, the Eastern District of 
New York avoided some of the more complicated questions concerning 
other methods of proving congressional intent.59  If, for instance, the court 
had found the text and structure of the statute to be ambiguous concerning 
congressional intent, it might have been pressed to consider other methods 
of determining intent such as Congress’s expectations in light of the legal 
context in which the statute was passed.60  Rather than independently 
examining congressional intent concerning the creation of a private right, 
                                                                                                                 
matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.’" 
(citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001))). 
 55. See id. at *4 (setting forth the plaintiff’s argument that the text and structure of 42 
U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) support the implication of a private remedy because it contains rights-
creating language not present in other similar statutes where the courts have failed to find a 
private remedy). 
 56. See id. ("[T]he Church Amendment lacks the classic individual rights-creating 
language of Title VI and Title IX (‘No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination’) 
under which implied private rights of action have been found." (citations omitted)).  
 57. See id. (saying that the Church Amendment "lacks the focus on individuals" 
necessary to infer congressional intent to create a private remedy and that the legislative 
history similarly fails to demonstrate such intent). 
 58. Id.  
 59. See id. at *3 (stating that statutes which "grant[] no private rights to any 
identifiable class" will not be found to contain an implied right of action (quoting Gonzaga 
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283–84 (2002))); id. at *4 (holding that the Church Amendment 
fails the test set forth in Gonzaga and that a private right of action, therefore, cannot be 
implied). 
 60. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (stating that contemporary 
legal context is relevant where the text is ambiguous as to Congress’s intent to create a 
private remedy), see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 
353, 378 (1982)  ("In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a federal 
statutory scheme . . . the initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the 
legislation was enacted."). 
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the court confined its inquiry to a narrow comparison of the text of the 
Church Amendment with the text of Titles VI and IX.61  The court then 
effectively concluded that the failure of the Church Amendment to mirror 
the "classic rights-creating language" of these statutes indicates that no 
private right was intended.62 
Although the Second Circuit expanded the inquiry beyond a 
comparison to the language of Titles VI and IX, it similarly found a lack of 
evidence that Congress intended to create a private remedy.63  While 
acknowledging the existence of some evidence of congressional intent to 
create a private right, the Second Circuit emphasized the distinction 
between intent to create a private right and intent to confer a private right of 
action.64  The result, according to the Second Circuit, is that "Section 300 
may be a statute in which Congress conferred an individual right without an 
accompanying right of action."65  Under the Second Circuit’s analysis, it is 
unnecessary to determine whether the Church Amendment confers 
individual rights because there is not sufficient evidence of congressional 
intent to create a right of action to enforce them. 
This Note will argue that the district court’s requirement of strict 
adherence to the structure of Title VI is an imprecise means of statutory 
interpretation that precludes the consideration of other meaningful 
indicators of Congress’s intent respecting the Church Amendment.66  It will 
advance the argument that the Second Circuit’s analysis, while an 
improvement, similarly fails to adequately consider other pertinent sources 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (comparing the text of the Church Amendment to 
Title VI and IX’s "no person shall" language and concluding that the Church Amendment 
does not similarly indicate intent to confer private rights). 
 62. See id. ("Plaintiff’s efforts to distinguish the Church Amendment, however, are 
unpersuasive.  Like FERPA, the Church Amendment lacks the classic individual rights-
creating language of Title VI and Title IX (‘No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to 
discrimination’) under which implied private rights of action have been found." (citations 
omitted)). 
 63. Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2010) ("While 
there may be some colorable evidence of intent to confer or recognize an individual right, 
there is no evidence that Congress intended to create a right of action."). 
 64. See id. ("We are mindful of a more recent instruction from the High Court that 
‘[t]he judicial task is to . . . determine whether [a statute] displays an intent to create not just 
a private right but also a private remedy.’" (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 
286 (2001))). 
 65. Id. at 698–99. 
 66. See infra notes 193–224 and accompanying text (criticizing the district court’s 
treatment of the Church Amendment and setting forth an argument for the propriety of 
finding a right of action under the statute). 
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of evidence regarding congressional intent.  This failure to properly account 
for other indicators of congressional intent leaves the Church Amendment 
plaintiff wrestling with the troubling notion set forth by the Second 
Circuit—that Congress may have intended to create a private right without 
an accompanying remedy.67  This Note will argue that such a result is 
untenable and that private enforcement is necessary to achieve Congress’s 
goal of protecting individuals from discrimination on the basis of their 
religious and moral views respecting abortion.68  However, considering the 
reluctance of the modern Court to find implied rights of action and the 
troubles faced in the courts by Church Amendment plaintiffs thus far, it 
may be necessary for Congress to revisit this topic and explicitly provide 
for private enforcement in abortion discrimination and coercion cases. 
V.  The Historical Trend Away from Judicial Implication of 
Private Remedies 
To understand the Cenzon-DeCarlo decision, it is necessary to 
understand the evolution of the federal judiciary’s approach to deciding 
implication questions.  To the casual observer and particularly to plaintiffs 
like Mrs. Cenzon-DeCarlo whose federally protected interests have been 
violated, the idea that there may be no means to enforce those protected 
interests may be confusing indeed.69  When a court determines that 
Congress did not intend for a private remedy to accompany the protections 
provided, plaintiffs are left with a frustrating and seemingly odd result.  In 
some circumstances, these individuals are left without a means to vindicate 
their rights.70  Cenzon-DeCarlo, for instance, faces the choice to either 
continue working as a nurse with little assurance that she will not again be 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 626 F.3d at 698–99 ("Section 300 may be a statute in which 
Congress conferred an individual right without an accompanying right of action."). 
 68. See infra notes 236–63 and accompanying text (arguing that the effective 
implementation of Congress’s oft-expressed prohibition of discriminatory action against 
individuals on the basis of their religious or moral views on participating in abortions 
depends upon private enforcement). 
 69. See Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the 
Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 903 (1996) 
("When a person suffers injury at the hands of another person whose injury-causing actions 
are in violation of law, our intuitive sense is that the injured party should have a meaningful 
remedy."). 
 70. See id. at 904 (describing the occurrence of events which leave an aggrieved party 
without a meaningful remedy and arguing that the courts should be more willing to imply a 
cause of action in cases where such an occurrence is likely). 
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faced with coercive or discriminatory measures or else she must look for 
alternative employment.  To better understand this troubling result, we now 
turn to a brief history of the Supreme Court’s approach to resolving 
implication questions. 
Over the past several decades, the federal judiciary, following the lead 
of several key Supreme Court decisions, has become increasingly hesitant 
to imply private rights of action from federal laws.71  During this time, the 
once prevailing view that every legal wrong should be met with a remedy 
lost ground in the courts and was replaced with strong deference indications 
of congressional intent and purpose.72  Although the courts were implying 
rights of action with less frequency, it was not until the seminal decision in 
Cort v. Ash73 that federal courts were given an analytic framework for how 
to decide implication questions.74  In Cort, the Supreme Court applied a 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See id. at 865 (showing that a more "restrictive notion of when to imply private 
causes of action" developed during the twentieth century in response to increases in federal 
legislation). 
 72. See id. at 864–65 (pointing to the fact that the courts shifted away from the early 
view that they should imply a remedy for all statutory wrongs where they were not expressly 
granted in favor of the view that congressional intent should control the question of whether 
a remedy should be provided); see also Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and 
Remedies:  An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV 67, 68–69 (2001) (describing the role 
of the Supreme Court in spurring the shift from the traditional view that courts should imply 
remedies for wrongs where legislatures had failed to do so); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374–75 (1982) (discussing the once common practice 
of implying private rights of action, saying that "the judiciary normally recognized a remedy 
for members of that class.  Under this approach, federal courts . . . regarded the denial of a 
remedy as the exception rather than the rule").  The Court, in Merrill Lynch, suggested that 
this break from the remedial approach to implication questions was motivated in part by 
increases in the volume and complexity of federal statutes.  See id. at 377 ("The increased 
complexity of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation strongly 
supported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent than Rigsby had 
required."). 
 73. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 85 (1975) (declining to imply a private right of 
action under a federal criminal statute making it a crime for corporations to make 
contributions or expenditures in connection with Presidential elections).  In Cort, a 
stockholder in a Delaware corporation brought an action for damages against the corporation 
for alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 610, which prohibits corporations from making 
contributions or expenditures in connection with certain federal elections.  Id. at 71–72.  The 
Court addressed the question of whether a private cause of action for damages should be 
implied under § 610.  Id. at 68.  Announcing and applying a new four-part test to determine 
whether a private right of action should be implied, the Court determined that it should not.  
Id. at 78–85.  The Court found that the implication of a private right of action was not 
supported by the legislative history, would not further the main purpose of § 610, and would 
intrude into an area of law traditionally left to the states.  Id. at 69, 85. 
 74. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 867 (saying that Cort v. Ash "had a significant 
impact on the implied cause of action doctrine" by introducing a "new method of analyzing 
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comprehensive four factor test to be used when deciding whether to imply a 
right of action from a federal statute.75  The Court stated: 
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute . . . 
several factors are relevant.  First, . . . does the statute create a federal 
right in favor of the plaintiff?  Second, is there any indication of 
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or 
deny one?  Third, is it consistent with the underlying purpose of the 
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?  And finally, 
is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law . . . so that it 
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal 
law?76 
By focusing largely on statutory construction and purpose, this formulation 
marks a stark departure from the earlier remedial analytic framework 
towards a more focused inquiry into legislative intent.77 
This shift towards a focus on legislative intent was solidified in 1979 
when the Court announced that legislative intent was the "central inquiry" 
in deciding whether to infer a private right of action from federal law.78  
The Court distanced itself from the framework established in Cort v. Ash by 
downplaying the importance of those factors that did not relate most 
directly to congressional intent.79  Although some courts still "speak in 
terms of a Cort analysis, the notion since 1979 has been that congressional 
intent controls."80 
Since congressional intent is the controlling consideration in whether 
or not to infer a private right of action from a federal law, the question of 
                                                                                                                 
implication questions"). 
 75. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (explaining the decision of whether to imply a right of 
action depends upon the plaintiff’s status as an intended beneficiary, legislative intent to 
create a right of action, consistency with the legislative scheme, and consideration of 
whether it is an area of law traditionally left to the states). 
 76. Id. (citations omitted). 
 77. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 867 (showing that the first two Cort factors focus 
largely on legislative intent); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575–
76 (1979) ("[T]he first three factors discussed in Cort . . . are ones traditionally relied upon 
in determining legislative intent."). 
 78. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575 ("The central inquiry remains whether Congress 
intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action."); see also 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (saying that the Cort factors are to be 
used as means of discovering legislative intent). 
 79. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575 ("It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth 
four factors that it considered ‘relevant’ in determining whether a private remedy is implicit 
in a statute not expressly providing one.  But the Court did not decide that each of these 
factors is entitled to equal weight."). 
 80. Stabile, supra note 69, at 870. 
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how to interpret that intent is of vast importance.  Determining legislative 
intent from the bench can be an incredibly difficult task considering the 
unavoidable ambiguities present in congressional statutes.81  Beyond the 
text of the statute itself, the most logical starting place is the legislative 
history; however, legislative history may itself produce equally 
inconclusive results.82  The legislative history of the Church Amendment, 
for instance, suggests that the Senators themselves were confused about the 
possibility of a sanction for violations.83  They did not even mention private 
enforcement.84  Acknowledging the commonality of such ambiguities, the 
Supreme Court has alluded to the fact that legislative history is neither the 
only nor last indicia of legislative intent.85   
Although the Court has not clearly provided an analytic framework for 
discovering legislative intent beyond the confines of text and legislative 
history, a couple of approaches can, nonetheless, be distilled from Court 
precedent.86  For instance, the Court has, in the past, taken notice of the 
legislative and judicial context in which a law was enacted in order to infer 
congressional intent to create or deny a right of action.87  This approach 
considers Congress’s possible reliance on the formerly common judicial 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See Brian G. Slocum, Overlooked Temporal Issues in Statutory Interpretation, 
81 TEMPLE L. REV. 635, 639 (2008) ("The rules of interpretation are most important when 
courts use them to resolve statutory ambiguities, and modern statutes are often unclear.  
Congress inevitably leaves ambiguities in the statutes it enacts because it is unable and 
frequently unwilling to legislate without ambiguities."). 
 82. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694 ("We must recognize, however, that the legislative 
history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be 
equally silent or ambiguous on the question."). 
 83. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of 
the Church Amendment and revealing the inconclusive nature of the Senate’s consideration 
of penalties for statutory violations). 
 84. See 119 CONG. REC. 9598–9605 (Senate debates over the Church Amendment) 
(making no mention of private enforcement). 
 85. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) ("‘[When] it is clear that 
federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an 
intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause 
of action would be controlling.’" (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975))); see also 
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) ("This Court has held 
that the failure of Congress expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably 
inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy available."). 
 86. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 888–93, 899–901 (pointing to legislative and judicial 
context, the possible necessity of implication, and consistency with Congress’s purpose as 
indicia used by the Court at various times to determine legislative intent). 
 87. See id. at 888–90 (discussing the ramifications of the Court’s consideration of 
context in deciphering legislative intent). 
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practice of implying causes of action from statutes that do not expressly 
provide them.88 
The 1979 decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago89 provides a 
useful example of how contextual considerations can help determine 
legislative intent concerning the provision of private rights of action.  In 
Cannon, the Court devoted considerable attention to the fact that Congress 
likely relied upon the then prevailing practice of the courts implying private 
rights of action under similar statutes like Title VI.90  Noting the similarity 
between the provisions of Title VI and Title IX,91 the Court said that 
although Congress did not directly address the question of a private cause 
of action, the fact that they considered the enforcement mechanisms of Title 
VI raises a presumption that they expected Title IX to be treated similarly 
by the courts.92  Although the Cannon Court did not ultimately rely upon 
this analysis directly, citing ample additional evidence from the text and 
legislative history from which to infer intent, its consideration of 
                                                                                                                 
 88. See id. at 888 ("Context includes the then-prevailing understanding of substantive 
law, as well as the then-prevailing view of courts as to when implication of a private cause 
of action is appropriate and as to the role of the federal courts in the creation of federal 
common law."). 
 89. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (holding that a private cause of action is implied 
under Title IX "despite the absence of any express authorization for it in the statute").  In 
Cannon, petitioner brought a lawsuit under Title IX against the University of Chicago 
alleging that the University failed to admit her to the medical school because she was a 
woman.  Id. at 680.  The Court considered the question of whether Title IX, which did not 
explicitly authorize a private right of action, provides for a private cause of action by 
implication.  Id. at 688.  Upon consideration of legislative intent, the Court concluded that a 
private cause of action was indeed implicitly created under Title IX.  Id. at 717.  In arriving 
at this conclusion, the Court considered not only the text and legislative history of the statute 
but also the larger context in which the law was passed.  Id. at 696. 
 90. See id. at 697–98 ("[W]e are especially justified in presuming both that those 
representatives were aware of the prior interpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation 
reflects their intent with respect to Title IX."). 
 91. Compare Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) 
(providing generally that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, 
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance"), with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) 
(providing that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"). 
 92. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979) (saying that Congress’s 
consideration of Title VI’s enforcement mechanisms demonstrates their assumption "that it 
would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the preceding eight years"). 
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Congress’s likely reliance on judicial practices demonstrates the 
applicability of contextual considerations in determining legislative intent.93 
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran,94 the Court 
expanded on the contextual approach to inferring intent by saying that the 
starting point for deciding implication questions is an examination of the 
legal context in which the law was adopted.95  In this case, the Court found 
the prior implication of a remedy under the pre-amended version of the 
Commodities Exchange Act to be strong evidence of congressional intent to 
retain similar enforcement provisions in the amended version.96  Although 
this case involved the amendment of a statute under which a private right of 
action had previously been implied, the Court gives no indication that their 
analysis of the legal context is limited to such cases.  To the contrary, the 
Court spoke of context as being the starting point for all implication 
questions and said that evaluating Congress’s perception of the state of the 
law is necessary whether they are "shaping or reshaping" legislation.97 
Despite these prior recognitions that contextual considerations are 
instrumental in the determination of congressional intent, the 2001 decision 
in Alexander v. Sandoval98 casts some doubt on the continued viability of 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See id. at 699 (stating that "[i]t is not . . . necessary to rely on these presumptions" 
due to textual and historical evidence that Congress understood Title IX to create a private 
cause of action). 
 94. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 388 
(1982) (holding that a private right of action was intended and therefore available under the 
1974 amendments to the Commodities Exchange Act [CEA]). 
 95. See id. at 378 ("In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a 
federal statutory scheme . . . the initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the 
legislation was enacted."). 
 96. See id. at 381–82 ("[T]he fact that a comprehensive reexamination and significant 
amendment of the CEA left intact the statutory provisions under which the federal courts had 
implied a cause of action is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to preserve 
that remedy."). 
 97. Id. at 378. 
 98. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that no private right 
of action exists under § 602 of Title VI).  In Sandoval, the Court considered whether a 
private right of action was implied under § 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Id. at 279.  
Rejecting the notion that this question had already been answered affirmatively in prior 
Court decisions finding a right of action under § 601, Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, 
said that the "right must come, if at all, from the independent force of § 602."  Id. at 286.  
After echoing the well-established rule that congressional intent controls such 
determinations, the Court found no such intent to create a private right of action under § 602.  
Id. at 289.  In so doing, the Court addressed the applicability of contextual considerations to 
the question saying that "legal context matters only to the extent that it clarifies text."  Id. at 
288. 
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contextual arguments in implication cases.99  Addressing the importance of 
contextual considerations, the Court disagreed with the notion that "cases 
interpreting statutes enacted prior to Cort v. Ash have given dispositive 
weight to the expectations that the enacting Congress had formed in light of 
the contemporary legal context."100  The Court then continued to downplay 
the relevance of legal context in favor of an isolated analysis of the text and 
structure.101  Finding no textual or structural evidence of congressional 
intent to create a right of action, the Court held that a right of action would 
not lie under § 602 of Title VI.102 
While Sandoval does suggest that extra-textual considerations will be 
accorded less consideration than a more liberal reading of past precedent 
would permit, the Court does not completely rule out contextual 
considerations where the text of the statute leaves open the possibility of a 
private remedy.103  The Court makes much of the fact that the text under 
consideration in Sandoval had a regulatory, rather than a rights-creating, 
focus.104  Therefore, the Court’s hesitancy to consider the contemporary 
legal context in Sandoval is supported by the fact that the text itself 
suggests a private remedy was not intended.105  Where a statute contains 
rights-creating language found in other statutes where private remedies 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See id. ("In determining whether statutes create private rights of action, as in 
interpreting statutes generally, legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text." 
(citations omitted)). 
 100. Id. at 287–88 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101. See id. (reading past decisions that incorporated contextual analysis narrowly by 
saying that two such cases involved the use of "verbatim statutory text that courts had 
previously interpreted to create a private right of action" while a third pertained to a statutory 
text that "independently supported" a private right of action). 
 102. See id. at 289, 293 (finding no evidence of congressional intent to create a private 
right of action and holding, therefore, that no such right exists). 
 103. See id. at 288 ("We have never accorded dispositive weight to context shorn of 
text."). Compare id. (saying that contextual considerations attain relevance only where they 
buttress or clarify the text), with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 
U.S. 353, 378 (1982) ("In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a 
federal statutory scheme . . . the initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the 
legislation was enacted."). 
 104. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288–89 (2001) ("It is immediately clear 
that the ‘rights-creating’ language so critical to the Court’s analysis in Cannon of § 601 is 
completely absent from § 602 . . . .  Far from displaying congressional intent to create new 
rights, § 602 limits agencies to ‘effectuating’ rights already created by § 601." (citations 
omitted)). 
 105. See id. at 289 ("Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the 
individuals protected create ‘no implication of an intent to confer private rights on a 
particular class of persons.’" (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981))); 
id. at 288 (saying that "legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text"). 
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have been implied, a different result with respect to consideration of legal 
context could, and arguably should, be reached.106 
The language of the Church Amendment fits somewhere between the 
pure rights-creating language of provisions such as § 601 of Title VI and 
the clearly regulatory language of § 602 of Title VI.107  Although the 
Church Amendment is aimed at the entities receiving appropriations under 
the Act rather than the persons protected, it does recognize individual, 
protected interests previously unknown to the law.108  The Church 
Amendment must, therefore, be distinguished from § 602 of Title VI under 
which the Court found no textual evidence of Congressional intent to create 
a right of action.109  Statutory language of this sort, arguably creating new 
rights by language somewhat dissimilar from other provisions found to 
create private rights of action, seems to justify the kind of clarifying 
exploration into contemporary legal context suggested by the Court in 
Sandoval.110  Therefore, Sandoval should not prevent litigants who make 
well-crafted arguments which emphasize the Church Amendment’s focus 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority reached the wrong 
conclusion concerning whether § 602 should be read independently from Title VI as a 
whole, which has been held to "benefit a particular class of individuals," and that the 
majority, therefore, improperly refused to consider contextual evidence). 
 107. Compare Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) 
("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." (emphasis added)), 
and id. § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 ("Each Federal department and agency which is 
empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity . . . is 
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of Section 2000d . . . by issuing rules, 
regulations, or orders of general applicability . . . ." (emphasis added)), with Church 
Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) ("No entity which receives [appropriations under this 
act] . . . may discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of employment of 
any physician or other health care personnel . . . ." (emphasis added)). 
 108. But see Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010), aff’d, 626 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that 
the absence of "classic individual rights creating language of Title VI and Title IX" suggests 
that the Church Amendment did not create individual rights that could be enforced in court). 
 109. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (creating new individual protections not present 
elsewhere in the statute or code), with Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289 ("Far from displaying 
congressional intent to create new rights, § 602 limits agencies to ‘effectuating’ rights 
already created by § 601." (citing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act § 602, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d-1)). 
 110. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) ("In determining whether 
statutes create private rights of action, as in interpreting statutes generally, legal context 
matters only to the extent it clarifies text."). 
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on the individuals protected from offering contextual evidence to 
demonstrate congressional intent to create a private remedy.111 
Sandoval does, however, place another obstacle before litigants 
bringing suit under the Church Amendment because it represents a 
significant step in the Court’s gradual departure from the pre-Cort remedial 
approach to implication questions.112  Considering the respondent’s 
arguments to be a request to consider Title VI under that remedial 
framework, which was prevalent at the time of Title VI’s adoption, the 
Court said, "[h]aving sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress’s 
intent, we will not accept respondents’ invitation to have one last drink."113  
Instead, the Court emphasized that its own role was merely to determine 
whether Congress intended to create a private remedy to seek redress for 
violations of the private right recognized in the statute.114  Although this 
language does not, on its own, dictate the conclusion that Sandoval 
represents a heightened standard for proving the existence of private rights 
of action, the strength of the language does suggest, as noted by the dissent, 
certain distaste for implied rights of action by the majority.115 
This distaste for implied rights of action was demonstrated once again 
in the 2008 decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta116 in which the Court refused to expand the scope of the existing 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See id. (explaining that "rights-creating" language is "critical" to a successful 
showing of congressional intent to create a right of action).  But see id. at 289 ("Statutes that 
focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create ‘no implication of 
an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons.’" (quoting California v. Sierra 
Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981))). 
 112. See id. at 287 (saying that the Court had abandoned the pre-Cort remedial 
approach which had emphasized the courts’ duty to "be alert to provide such remedies as are 
necessary to make effective" Congress’s purposes in enacting a statute (quoting J.I. Case Co. 
v. Bork, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964))). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 286–87 ("The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed 
to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private 
remedy . . . .  Without [statutory intent], a cause of action does not exist and courts may not 
create one . . . ." (citations omitted)). 
 115. See id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (saying that the majority’s rejection of a 
private right of action under § 602 demonstrates an "evident antipathy toward implied rights 
of action"). 
 116. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 
(2008) (holding that the § 10b private right of action should not be extended because it was 
determined to be contrary to congressional intent).  In Stoneridge, the petitioner filed suit 
under § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 alleging fraudulent behavior on behalf 
of customers and suppliers of Charter Communications, in which they held stock.  Id. at 
152–53.  The Court considered whether the implied right of action previously recognized by 
the Court under § 10b should be extended to cover aiders and abettors.  Id. at 157–58.  The 
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right of action under § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.117  
Although Stoneridge was a case in which strong evidence of congressional 
intent to deny the extension of the right of action was present, it nonetheless 
indicates a strengthening of the Court’s presumption against implied rights 
of action.118 
VI.  Past Judicial Treatment of an Implied Right of Action Under the 
Church Amendment 
The federal courts have had relatively few occasions to address the 
question of the existence of a right of action under the Church Amendment.  
In the time between its enactment and the Cenzon-DeCarlo case, the courts 
have only addressed the question, either directly or indirectly, on four 
separate occasions.119  The question first came up, albeit tangentially, in the 
1973 case Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center.120  There, the plaintiff filed a 
                                                                                                                 
Court found that Congress had made an affirmative choice not to extend the scope of Section 
10b to such actors.  Id. at 158.  Therefore, the Court reasoned, to expand the scope of the 
right of action would "undermine Congress’ determination that this class of defendants 
should be pursued by the SEC . . . ."  Id. at 163.  In so ruling, the Court reemphasized the 
oft-stated proposition that a private right of action would not be found where congressional 
intent to do so is found lacking.  Id. at 164. 
 117. See id. at 165 ("Though it remains the law, the § 10b private right should not be 
extended beyond its present boundaries."). 
 118. See id. at 158, 166 (finding evidence that Congress had affirmatively rejected an 
extension of the right of action under Section 10b); id. at 179–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority’s conclusion that "Congress did not impliedly authorize [the] private 
cause of action" and arguing that the decision "cuts back further on Congress’ intended 
remedy"); id. at 175–76 ("The Court’s current view of implied causes of action is that they 
are merely a ‘relic’ of our prior ‘heady days.’" (quoting Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 
U.S. 61, 75 (2001))). 
 119. See Carey v. Maricopa County, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1144 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 
2009) (ruling that the plaintiff had the right to bring a claim for damages against Maricopa 
County defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)); Nead v. Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 
05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006) (holding that the Church 
Amendment does not contain an implied private right of action); Moncivaiz v. Dekalb 
County, No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2004) (holding that no 
private right of action exists under the Church Amendment); Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 
364 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D. Idaho 1973) (holding that the Church Amendment required the 
reinstatement of a doctor who had been released because of his failure to endorse the 
hospital’s ethical and religious directives). 
 120. See Watkins, 364 F. Supp. at 803 (holding that the Church Amendment required 
the reinstatement of a doctor who had been released because of his failure to endorse the 
hospital’s ethical and religious directives).  In Watkins, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 suit 
against his employer hospital which had refused to extend staff privileges to him because of 
his failure to abide by the hospital’s ethical guidelines concerning abortion and sterilization.  
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§ 1983121 action against his employer hospital for its alleged failure to 
extend his staff privileges because of his refusal to abide by the hospital’s 
ethical guidelines concerning abortion and sterilization.122  The court 
addressed the question of whether the receipt of Hill-Burton Act funds 
sufficiently colored the hospital with state action so as to give rise to a 
§ 1983 claim.123  The court concluded the receipt of federal funding did not 
give rise to a finding that the hospital’s hiring decisions were colored with 
state action.124  However, the court did find that the Church Amendment 
prevented the hospital from requiring "its staff to adhere to the religious or 
moral beliefs which support the hospital’s policy as a condition of 
employment or extension of privileges."125 
Although the question was not directly before the court, the fact that 
the court recognized the enforceability of the Church Amendment’s 
protections certainly supports the argument for implying a cause of 
action.126  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and made specific 
reference to the trial court’s order of reinstatement as being a part of the 
judgment rather than mere dicta.127  Watkins was denied damages for his 
                                                                                                                 
Id. at 800.  The court’s narrow inquiry was whether the receipt of Hill-Burton funding made 
the hospital a state actor for the purposes of evaluating § 1983 liability.  Id. at 801.  The 
court concluded that it did not.  Id. at 802.  The court did state, however, that the Church 
Amendment prevented the hospital from requiring "its staff to adhere to the religious or 
moral beliefs" underpinning the hospital’s policies as a condition of employment.  Id. at 803. 
 121. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a private right of action for individuals 
against state actors or individuals and entities acting under color of state law for redress of 
violations of federal constitutional or statutory protections). 
 122. See Watkins, 364 F. Supp. at 800 ("The plaintiff brought this action . . . contending 
that he had been denied medical staff privileges for failure to agree to, or abide by, the 
ethical or religious directives under the Code of Ethics for Catholic Hospitals . . . ."). 
 123. See id. at 801 ("In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it must 
be shown that Mercy Medical Center and its Board of Directors were acting under color of 
State law when they denied Dr. Watkins staff privileges."). 
 124. See id. at 802 ("Since hospital policy is not and has not been affected by the 
benefits bestowed upon it by the state, defendants were not acting under color of state 
law . . . .").  
 125. Id. at 803; see also Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 520 F.2d 894, 895–96 (9th Cir. 
1975) ("[T]he court found that appellee had violated 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 . . . .  The judgment 
provided for the restoration of Dr. Watkins to staff privileges on condition that he not 
perform abortions or sterilizations contrary to the hospital’s rules."). 
 126. See Eisendstadt, supra note 51, at 154 (suggesting that the court’s treatment of the 
Church Amendment was largely dicta). 
 127. See Watkins, 520 F.2d at 896 (saying that "[t]he judgment provided for the 
restoration of Dr. Watkins to staff privileges").  But see Eisendstadt, supra note 51, at 154 
(suggesting that the district court’s language regarding the reinstatement of Dr. Watkins was 
"in dicta"). 
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§ 1983 claim because the hospital’s receipt of federal funding was 
deemed to be insufficient to color their employment and ethical policies 
with state action.128  It is not clear how the courts might have responded 
had Watkins sought damages directly under the Church Amendment.129  
However, the fact that the Ninth Circuit took no issue with the District 
Court’s order of reinstatement, a private remedy, suggests that they might 
have responded favorably had the plaintiff effectively made out a case for 
damages. 
After Watkins, many years passed before the courts had occasion to 
address the existence of a private remedy under the Church Amendment.  
During this roughly thirty-year gap, the judiciary’s approach to 
implication questions underwent significant change.130  The existence of 
this gap between cases addressing the existence of a right of action under 
the Church Amendment thus poses a great difficulty as courts must now 
choose how to properly apply newly created interpretive rules to outdated 
legislation.131  An inflexible application of current implication doctrine in 
cases involving dated statutes such as the Church Amendment might 
thwart, rather than preserve, congressional intent.132  However, stepping 
back in time by attempting to understand congressional intent through the 
lens of context is a difficult and time-consuming task that must be far less 
appealing than more readily accessible indicators of intent such as 
legislative history.  The following cases suggest that Church Amendment 
plaintiffs will face the difficult task of convincing the courts to move 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See Watkins, 520 F.2d at 896 ("‘The mere receipt of Hill-Burton funds . . . is not 
sufficient connection between the state and the private activity of which appellant complains 
to make out state action . . . .’" (quoting Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Med. Ctr., 
507 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1974))). 
 129. See Eisendstadt, supra note 51, at 154 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit applied 
the Church Amendment without providing any discussion of its "constitutionality or the 
appropriate means of reliance on it"). 
 130. See supra notes 71–118 and accompanying text (describing the development of the 
Supreme Court’s approach to implication questions throughout the twentieth century with a 
particular emphasis on the years since 1975). 
 131. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 889–90 (arguing that modern courts, deciding 
whether to imply a right of action under an older statute, must take into account how the then 
existing courts dealt with implication questions and how Congress understood implication at 
that time). 
 132. Cf. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 698–99 (1979) (saying that even where 
the Court has adopted a more stringent interpretive approach for implication questions, it 
must still evaluate congressional action in light of "its contemporary legal context"). 
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beyond an isolated analysis of legislative history in their search for 
congressional intent.133 
In 2004, the Northern District of Illinois heard the case of Moncivaiz v. 
Dekalb County134 and denied private relief under the Church 
Amendment.135  In Moncivaiz, the plaintiff, a part-time secretary, alleged 
that she had been denied employment as a full-time secretary with Dekalb 
County’s Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program because of her 
expressed opposition to abortion.136  The plaintiff was further told that as an 
employee of the Health Department, she would be expected to "uphold the 
views of the department even outside of the facility."137  Upon receiving 
this information, the plaintiff resigned her part-time position and filed suit 
citing numerous violations of federal statutory and constitutional law.138 
In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Church Amendment 
claim, the court relied upon Seventh Circuit precedent and the oft-quoted 
maxim that a strong presumption exists against the implication of private 
rights of action.139  In the court’s view, this presumption could not be 
overcome in the absence of proof from the legislative history that Congress 
intended to grant a private remedy.140  Due to the court’s brief treatment of 
the Church Amendment claim, it is difficult to determine exactly why it 
was denied.  From the language used it seems that the lack of evidence 
from the legislative history was the decisive point.141  The Northern District 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See Moncivaiz v. Dekalb Cnty., No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 12, 2004) (determining congressional intent with regards to a private right of action 
under the Church Amendment by means of analyzing only the legislative history); Nead v. 
Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006) 
(same). 
 134. See Moncivaiz, 2004 WL 539994, at *3 (holding that the Church Amendment does 
not support the implication of a private right of action). 
 135. See id. (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7). 
 136. See id. at *1 (describing how the plaintiff was told she was not hired for the 
position because of her views concerning abortion in spite of her qualifications for the job). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. (listing the plaintiff’s many claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title 
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7, and the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act). 
 139. See id. at *3 ("The statute does not create an express private right of action and a 
strong presumption exists against creation of an implied right of action." (citing Endsley v. 
City of Chi., 230 F.3d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 2000))). 
 140. See id. ("Plaintiff does not cite any legislative history to suggest a private right of 
action was intended.  Absent such a suggestion, the court ‘will not imply a private right of 
action where none appears in the statute.’" (quoting Endsley, 230 F.3d at 281)). 
 141. See id. (suggesting that legislative history is the only acceptable source of proof 
that an implied private right of action should be found). 
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of Illinois did not make reference to any other indicia of legislative 
intent.142  As was the case here in Moncivaiz, an exclusive focus on 
legislative history to determine whether a private right of action was 
intended under the Church Amendment will result in the quick resolution of 
motions to dismiss in favor of defendants. 
The question of whether a private right of action exists under the 
Church Amendment was next raised two years later in the neighboring 
Central District of Illinois.143  As with Moncivaiz, the plaintiff in Nead v. 
Board of Trustees of Eastern Illinois University144 similarly claimed that 
she was passed over for a promotion due to her expression of opposition to 
abortion and the use of emergency contraception during an interview.145  
The plaintiff’s Church Amendment claim, based on 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)–
(d), consisted primarily of the argument that the hospital had discriminated 
against her in their promotion decisions because she had refused to 
participate in the dispensing of Emergency Contraception (EC) on the basis 
of her religious and moral beliefs.146  However, as in Moncivaiz, the court 
did not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s claim but rather granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss upon finding that the Church Amendment 
did not grant a private right of action.147 
The court in Nead relied heavily on the precedent set by the Northern 
District of Illinois in Moncivaiz.148  The court echoed the same language 
used by the Moncivaiz Court saying again that "a strong presumption exists 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See id. (mentioning only legislative history as a possible indicator of legislative 
intent to provide a private right of action). 
 143. See Nead v. Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5 
(C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim brought 
under the Church Amendment). 
 144. See id. (holding that the Church Amendment did not support the finding of an 
implied right of action). 
 145. See id. at *1 (outlining the details of the plaintiff’s interview including her 
response to the question of whether she would be willing to dispense emergency 
contraception). 
 146. See id. at *5 (describing the formulation of the plaintiff’s claim under the Church 
Amendment); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)–(d) (2006) ("No entity [receiving certain 
federal funding] may discriminate [against] health care personnel . . . because he refused 
to . . . assist in the performance of [abortion] . . . because of his religious beliefs or moral 
convictions . . . ."). 
 147. See id. ("The plaintiff makes an ardent but unavailing argument for reading a 
private right of action into the statute . . . .  The motion to dismiss Count V is granted."). 
 148. See id. (saying that the existence of an implied right of action under the Church 
Amendment had already been answered in the negative by the Moncivaiz court).   
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against the creation of an implied right of action."149  The court also 
incorporated, by quotation, the suggestion from Moncivaiz that evidence 
from the legislative history is necessary to establish a suggestion that 
Congress intended to provide a private right of action.150  The final 
disposition of the claim reinforces this position since it was dismissed for 
lack of evidence from the legislative history to support the implication of a 
right of action.151  The Nead case solidifies the implication raised by 
Moncivaiz that exclusive reliance on legislative history as the indicator of 
congressional intent will result in the dismissal of claims brought under the 
Church Amendment.152 
Moncivaiz and Nead both relied on the Seventh Circuit case Endsley v. 
City of Chicago153 in their determination that a private right of action was 
not implicit in the Church Amendment.154  The Moncivaiz decision suggests 
that the court was relying on Endsley for the proposition that evidence from 
the legislative history is necessary to demonstrate congressional intent to 
create a right of action.  While Endsley’s "strong presumption" language 
certainly suggests that implication questions will more often than not be 
answered in the negative, it does not, however, seem to demand narrowing 
the inquiry to the legislative history alone.155  In Endsley, the Seventh 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Id. (quoting Moncivaiz v. Dekalb Cnty., No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2004)). 
 150. See id. ("‘Plaintiff does not cite any legislative history to suggest a private right of 
action was intended.  Absent such a suggestion, the court, will not imply a private right of 
action where none appears in the statute.’" (quoting Moncivaiz, 2004 WL 539994, at *3)). 
 151. See id. ("[C]ounsel provides no legislative history to support Nead’s claim.  In 
fact, a cursory review of the legislation as a whole suggests the main purpose was to 
appropriate funds for health care services.  The motion to dismiss . . . is granted."). 
 152. See id. (dismissing the plaintiff’s Church Amendment claim due to lack of 
evidence from legislative history); see also Moncivaiz, 2004 WL 539994, at *3 (same). 
 153. Endsley v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 276, 280 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding the district 
court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against the City of Chicago which alleged 
violations of the Commerce Clause, the Sherman Act, and a federal transportation statute 
limiting the taking of tolls on federally funded roadways).  In Endsley, the plaintiff filed suit 
challenging the city’s appropriation of tolls taken on the Chicago Skyway.  Id. at 278.  One 
of the claims, which was based on a federal transportation statute, was dismissed by the 
district court because it found no private right of action under the statute.  Id. at 280.  The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed, saying that an implied right of action could not be found after a 
consideration of the statute’s language, structure, legislative history, and intended 
beneficiaries evidenced no congressional intent to create one.  Id. 
 154. See Moncivaiz, 2004 WL 539994 at *3  (citing Endsley for the proposition that 
there is a heavy presumption against implying a right of action in a federal statute); Nead v. 
Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006) 
(same). 
 155. See Endsley, 230 F.3d at 280 (looking to the express language of the statute in 
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Circuit focused on more than just the presence of evidence in the legislative 
history to make its determination that a private right of action should not be 
implied under a certain federal transportation statute.  Instead of focusing 
solely on the legislative record, the Endsley Court evaluated the statute’s 
text, language, overall structure, as well as its intended beneficiaries before 
determining that a right of action should not be implied.156  Whereas the 
federal transportation statute at issue in Endsley did not include the 
plaintiffs as intended beneficiaries, the Church Amendment most certainly 
includes individuals like the plaintiff in Moncivaiz as beneficiaries of its 
protections.157  Neither Nead nor Moncivaiz suggest that considerations 
such as this were weighed in conjunction with considerations of legislative 
history.158  Had they been considered, it is possible, although still uncertain, 
that a different conclusion might have been reached.  Due to the silence of 
the legislative history of the Church Amendment on the existence of a 
private right of action, if plaintiffs seeking relief under this statute want to 
survive a motion to dismiss they must persuade the courts to take a more 
comprehensive look at factors indicative of legislative intent rather than 
merely relying on legislative history.159 
Prior to Cenzon-DeCarlo, the most recent opportunity for a federal 
court to address the question of the existence of a private remedy under the 
Church Amendment came in 2009 in Carey v. Maricopa County.160  In 
Carey, the plaintiff brought a series of claims against Maricopa County 
                                                                                                                 
addition to its structure, legislative history, and intended beneficiaries).  
 156. See id. (evaluating statutory text, structure, legislative history, and the question of 
whether the statute was written for a particular class of intended beneficiaries prior to 
concluding that a right of action should not be implied). 
 157. Compare 23 U.S.C. § 129(a)(3) (2006) (generally setting forth the requirements 
for public authorities wishing to operate toll roads including an agreement with the Secretary 
of Transportation on a plan for properly allocating the toll proceed to the payment of debts 
and maintenance of the road), with Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2006) 
(providing that no entity receiving specified federal funds may discriminate against 
individuals because of their refusal to participate in abortion procedures due to religious or 
moral convictions). 
 158. See Moncivaiz v. Dekalb Cnty., No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 12, 2004) (mentioning only legislative history as an indicia of legislative intent to 
create or deny a right of action); Nead, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006) 
(same). 
 159. See Eisendstadt, supra note 51, at 160 (saying that the legislative history of the 
Church Amendment gives little indication concerning the existence of a private right of 
action under the statute). 
 160. See Carey v. Maricopa Cnty., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1144 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2009) 
(ruling that the plaintiff had the right to bring a claim for damages against Maricopa County 
defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 300a-7). 
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which he claimed attempted to remove him from leadership positions at 
Maricopa County Medical Center because of his participation in and 
position on abortions.161  Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on 
each of the plaintiff’s federal law claims were denied.162  Surprisingly, the 
court ruled that the plaintiff’s punitive damages claim under the Church 
Amendment survived the summary judgment motion without providing 
even a cursory discussion concerning the propriety of implying a right of 
action under the statute.163  While this is certainly a recent example of a 
private remedy being allowed under the Church Amendment, as Cenzon-
DeCarlo’s counsel rightly pointed out, the fact that the implication of a 
private remedy was not addressed by the court may make Carey somewhat 
unpersuasive in cases where that issue is directly in dispute.164 
Not surprisingly, the result in Cenzon-DeCarlo suggests that the 
Eastern District of New York was not persuaded by the Carey decision.165  
As with the only other cases that directly address the propriety of implying 
a right of action under the Church Amendment, Nead and Moncivaiz, the 
district court in Cenzon-DeCarlo found ample justification from 
authoritative Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedent to quickly dispose 
of the plaintiff’s claim.166  Although the Cenzon-DeCarlo court’s analysis 
differed from the earlier Church Amendment decisions, the result reinforces 
the reluctance of the modern courts to recognize implied remedies.167  The 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See id. at 1135 (stating that the plaintiff’s unauthorized rotation with Planned 
Parenthood was used by the County as a reason to remove him from leadership positions 
amounting to, in the plaintiff’s view, "unlawful discrimination . . . on the basis of his 
religious and moral views under state and federal law"). 
 162. See id. at 1136 ("Each of Plaintiff’s federal claims against County Defendants will 
survive summary judgment."). 
 163. See id. at 1144 ("Defendants do not dispute that there is no bar to his recovery of 
punitive damages against the Kunaseks under § 1983 or Title VII, nor against all County 
Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7.  Thus, those claims will stand."). 
 164. See id. (suggesting that punitive damages were allowed under the Church 
Amendment because of the defendant’s failure to make an assertion to the contrary); see also 
Response to Letter Request for Pre-Motion Conference at 2, Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount 
Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 169485 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) ("[J]ust this 
year the United States District Court in Arizona not only recognized an individual right, but 
allowed the plaintiff . . . to seek punitive damages"). 
 165. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 2010 WL 169485, at *4 (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim 
brought under the Church Amendment due to the finding that it does not imply a private 
right of action and making no mention of the different result reached in Carey). 
 166. See id. at *3–4 (referencing a host of Supreme Court opinions holding that the 
propriety of implying a right of action depends entirely on congressional intent and holding 
that evidence of such intent is lacking in the Church Amendment). 
 167. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 315 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
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result in Cenzon-DeCarlo is made all the more damaging to plaintiffs 
seeking to convince courts of the propriety of an implied right of action 
under the Church Amendment because the dismissal of the claim on the 
basis that the text itself definitively proves the absence of congressional 
intent effectively precludes the introduction of extra-textual evidence of 
congressional intent such as contemporary legal context.168 
In disposing of Cenzon-DeCarlo’s claim, the Eastern District of New 
York relied heavily on Gonzaga University v. Doe169 in effort to show that 
the Church Amendment, far from showing congressional intent to create a 
private remedy, fails to show congressional intent to create a private 
right.170  In Gonzaga, the Supreme Court reasoned that the initial inquiry in 
an implied right of action case is substantially the same as in cases brought 
under § 1983.171  In both cases, the Court must first determine whether 
Congress intended for the statute to create a federal right rather than mere 
                                                                                                                 
(saying that the Supreme Court’s rejection of a private remedy demonstrates an "evident 
antipathy toward implied rights of action").  Compare supra notes 1–8 and accompanying 
text (discussing the result reached by the Eastern District of New York in Cenzon-DeCarlo 
which  stemmed from the court’s determination that the Church Amendment did not contain 
sufficiently strong rights-creating language to justify implication), with supra notes 134–59 
and accompanying text (discussing the reliance of the Nead and Moncivaiz courts on the 
absence of proof in the legislative history concerning congressional intent to create a private 
remedy).  
 168. Cf. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288 ("In determining whether statutes create private 
rights of action, as in interpreting statutes generally, legal context matters only to the extent 
it clarifies text."). 
 169. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (holding that the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act [FERPA] did not create a federal right enforceable 
under § 1983).  In Gonzaga, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against Gonzaga 
University claiming unauthorized release of private information to an unauthorized person in 
violation of FERPA.  Id. at 277.  The Supreme Court considered whether FERPA created a 
federal right enforceable by private individuals bringing § 1983 actions.  Id. at 276.  The 
Court held that FERPA did not confer enforceable rights.  Id. at 290.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court found that FERPA lacked the classic rights-creating language showing 
congressional intent to create a new right, had an aggregate rather than individual focus, and 
contained an independent enforcement mechanism through the Department of Education.  
Id. at 287–89. 
 170. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 
169485, at 3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s argument that the Church 
Amendment meaningfully differs from the statute at issue in Gonzaga and holding that the 
Church Amendment similarly "lacks the classic individual rights-creating language . . . 
under which implied rights of action have been found" (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287)). 
 171. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284–85 ("But the initial inquiry—determining whether a 
statute confers any right at all—is no different from the initial inquiry in an implied right of 
action case . . . which is to determine whether or not a statute ‘confers rights on a particular 
class of persons.’" (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981))). 
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"benefits or interests."172  The Court contrasted the provisions of the statute 
at issue in Gonzaga which says "No funds shall be made available" with the 
classic rights-creating language of Title VI, which is phrased in terms of the 
individual protected, providing that "No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to 
discrimination."173  The Court concluded that the "[n]o funds" language is 
too far removed from the individuals protected to give rise to a claim under 
§ 1983.174  The Eastern District of New York incorporated this line of 
analysis in Cenzon-DeCarlo concluding that the lack of the classic "[n]o 
person shall" language present in Title VI and Title IX meant that the 
Church Amendment did not create private rights.175  Because there cannot 
logically be a right of action to enforce a nonexistent right, Cenzon-
DeCarlo’s arguments were rejected and the case dismissed.176  
The Eastern District’s reliance on Gonzaga in dismissing Cenzon-
DeCarlo’s claim is dissatisfying for two different reasons.  First, Gonzaga 
dealt with a claim brought under § 1983.177  Cenzon-DeCarlo, on the other 
hand, concerns implication, a related but different question.178  Although 
the language of the Gonzaga opinion downplays this dividing line for the 
purpose of importing some standards from implication cases into the § 1983 
case before the Court, it does not necessarily follow that language 
incidental to the Court’s application of those standards to a § 1983 case 
should be imported back into an implication decision.179  Second, the 
                                                                                                                 
 172. See id. at 285 ("Both inquiries simply require a determination as to whether or not 
Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries."). 
 173. Id. at 287. 
 174. See id. ("This focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual students 
and parents and clearly does not confer the sort of ‘individual entitlement’ that is enforceable 
under § 1983." (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997))). 
 175. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 2010 WL 169485, at *4 ("Like FERPA, the Church 
Amendment lacks the classic individual rights-creating language of Title VI and Title IX 
(‘No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination . . . .’) under which implied private 
rights of action have been found." (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002))). 
 176. See id. (dismissing Cenzon-DeCarlo’s complaint on the grounds that no private 
right was granted and therefore no private right of action was intended). 
 177. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002) ("The question presented is 
whether a student may sue a private university for damages under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . 
to enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 . . . ."). 
 178. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (answering in the negative the question of whether 
the Church Amendment confers a private right of action); Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 
(discussing the similarities and differences between § 1983 and implied right of action 
cases). 
 179. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 ("[W]e further reject the notion that our implied 
right of action cases are separate and distinct from our § 1983 cases.  To the contrary, our 
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Eastern District of New York’s treatment of Gonzaga takes the "rights-
creating" analysis a step further than the Supreme Court did.  The Supreme 
Court indicated that the language of FERPA was too far removed from the 
private interests at stake to support finding a private right.180  In so doing, it 
compared FERPA’s language to the classic rights-creating provisions of 
Title VI and Title IX; however, it did not treat the absence of Title IX’s "no 
person" language as dispositive.181  Rather, the Court also considered 
whether the statute concerned itself with aggregate or individual needs as 
well as the method of enforcement provided by Congress in the statute.182  
Alternatively, the Eastern District of New York effectively gives dispositive 
weight to the absence of the "no person" language in the Church 
Amendment.183 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district 
court, albeit under a slightly different mode of analysis.184  Rather than 
holding that the Church Amendment did not confer individual rights in the 
first place, the Second Circuit focused on the absence of proof that 
Congress intended to confer a private right of action.185  By focusing on 
proof of congressional intent to confer a private mode of enforcement, the 
Second Circuit produced a somewhat more palatable opinion than the 
district court which ruled that Congress did not confer individual rights in 
the first place.  Although the Second Circuit stopped short of analyzing 
congressional intent in light of the contemporary legal context, it did at 
                                                                                                                 
implied right of action cases should guide the determination of whether a statute confers 
rights enforceable under § 1983."); see also id. ("We have recognized that whether a 
statutory violation may be enforced through § 1983 ‘is a different inquiry than that involved 
in determining whether a private right of action can be implied from a particular statute.’" 
(quoting Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990))). 
 180. See id. at 287 ("This focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual 
students and parents and clearly does not confer the sort of individual entitlement that is 
enforceable under § 1983." (citations omitted)). 
 181. See id. at 287–89 (considering, in addition to the difference between FERPA and 
Titles VI and IX, the aggregate focus, the loose substantial compliance requirement, and the 
agency policy focus of the statute to conclude that no private rights were conferred). 
 182. Id. at 288–89. 
 183. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 2010 WL 169485, at *4 ("[I]t speaks to the funded entity 
rather than to any benefitted class and, therefore, lacks the focus on individuals that would 
indicate the necessary congressional intent that a private right of action be implied."). 
 184. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2010) 
("Section 300 does not confer upon Cenzon-DeCarlo a private right of action to enforce its 
terms.").  
 185. See id. at 697–99 (acknowledging evidence that Congress intended to confer 
individual rights but concluding that the Church Amendment "may be a statute in which 
Congress conferred an individual right without an accompanying right of action"). 
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least examine congressional intent in light of the text, structure, and 
legislative history of the statute.186  Ultimately, the court concluded that the 
Church Amendment is nothing more than a ban on discriminatory 
conduct.187  Relying on dicta from Cannon, the Second Circuit concluded 
that a private right of action should not be implied under the Church 
Amendment.188  In so finding, the court noted its willingness to accept the 
reality that Congress may have created an individual right without an 
accompanying remedy.189   
Although it is certainly possible, as the Second Circuit suggests, that 
Congress could create a private right without an accompanying right of 
action, it seems reasonable, in the face of that troubling irony, to ask 
whether that is the result Congress actually intended.  This additional 
inquiry might well lead the courts to acknowledge other indicators of 
congressional intent such as the contemporary legal context in which the 
statute was passed.  In the case of the Church Amendment, this deeper 
examination into legislative intent might well lead the courts to conclude 
that Congress did intend for the statute to be privately enforced.190  In spite 
of this small glimmer of hope for plaintiffs like Cenzon-DeCarlo, it is 
necessary to acknowledge the clear impact of the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Cenzon-DeCarlo—the federal courts are unlikely to recognize privately 
enforceable rights under the Church Amendment. 191  The clear trend since 
the mid-twentieth century has been away from implied rights of action and 
towards a strict requirement of explicit congressional authorization for 
private suits.192 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. at 698–99 (concluding that the language of the Church Amendment 
operates merely as a ban on discriminatory conduct (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 
U.S. 677, 690–93 (1979))).   
 188. See id. at 698 ("Cannon explicitly warns that language like that of Section 300 
does not signal Congressional intent to create a private remedy."). 
 189. See id. at 698–99 ("Section 300 may be a statute in which Congress conferred an 
individual right without an accompanying right of action.").   
 190. See infra Part VII (advancing an argument for finding an implied right of action 
under the Church Amendment).   
 191. See supra notes 119–89 and accompanying text (examining the previous instances 
of judicial rejection of an implied private right of action under the Church Amendment). 
 192. See supra notes 71–118 and accompanying text (demonstrating the departure of 
the Supreme Court from the early remedial approach to deciding implication questions and 
the Court’s adoption of a more restrictive approach to finding rights of action). 
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VII.  An Argument for an Implied Right of Action Under the Church 
Amendment 
Notwithstanding the trend away from finding implied rights of action, 
Supreme Court precedent does not completely foreclose the possibility of 
an implied remedy under the Church Amendment.  There are valid 
arguments to be made that should lead the courts to conduct a more 
searching examination concerning the possibility of an implied remedy 
under the Church Amendment.  To begin with, plaintiffs under the Church 
Amendment should carefully distinguish that statute from the one at issue 
in Gonzaga to show that an individual right was created and intended by 
Congress.193  Unlike FERPA, at issue in Gonzaga, the Church Amendment 
is not clearly meant to condition the receipt of federal funds on compliance 
with the statute.194  Certainly the language of the Church Amendment 
differs from the language of Titles VI and IX which has been enshrined as 
the "classic rights-creating language," yet the Church Amendment also 
lacks the clear funds-conditioning language of FERPA.195  The language of 
the Church Amendment lies somewhere in between these two extremes and 
accordingly deserves a more searching inquiry to determine whether 
Congress intended to create an individual right.  Indeed, Senator Javits, who 
sponsored the anti-discrimination portion of the Church Amendment, made 
clear that it was crafted to protect the right of the individual to be free from 
discrimination because of his or her position on abortion.196 
If the purpose of the Church Amendment was merely to condition the 
receipt of federal funds on compliance, one might wonder why Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (showing that the application of the Court’s 
reasoning in Gonzaga to the Church Amendment effectively forecloses all other arguments 
in favor of implying a right of action). 
 194. Compare Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278–79 (2002) (showing that 
FERPA was enacted to condition the receipt of federal funding on compliance with its 
requirements as evidenced by its language that begins "No funds shall be made available" to 
noncompliant programs (citations omitted)), with Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-
7(c) (2006) (lacking funds-conditioning language like that in FERPA and proscribing certain 
discriminatory actions by entities against individuals). 
 195. Compare FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(a) (2006) (beginning "[n]o funds shall be 
made available under any applicable program" which fails to conform to the statute’s 
privacy requirements), with Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (beginning "[n]o 
entity . . . may discriminate in . . . employment . . . or extension of staff or other privileges" 
on the basis of an individual’s willingness to participate in abortions or sterilizations). 
 196. See 119 CONG. REC. 9603 (1973) (statement of Senator Javits) ("I wish to make it 
clear that that particular amendment simply will protect anybody who works for that hospital 
against being fired or losing his hospital privileges . . . ."). 
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would fail to make that purpose explicit as it has done in other statutes such 
as FERPA.  Even if the Court’s analysis in Gonzaga is found to be 
authoritative in the implication context, the courts should recognize that the 
Church Amendment presents a different and more difficult case than the 
FERPA provisions with which that case is concerned.197  The requirement, 
as applied by the court in Cenzon-DeCarlo, that legislators from nearly 
forty years ago adhere with strict precision to a wording that would only 
later be dubbed as the "classic rights-creating language" seems to be a 
strangely imprecise means of determining "whether or not Congress 
intended to confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries."198 
The anti-discrimination provision of the Church Amendment is 
undeniably crafted to protect individuals from discriminatory behavior by 
healthcare entities receiving federal funding because of their religious 
beliefs or moral convictions concerning abortion or sterilization.199  
Although worded differently, it is analogous to the protections of Title VI 
which protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
or national origin by entities receiving federal funding.200  Though aimed at 
different forms of discrimination, both statutes share the same essential 
elements.  Both statutes affirm the right of individuals to be free from 
certain forms of discrimination by entities that have been empowered by 
                                                                                                                 
 197. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Church 
Amendment does not fit cleanly within either the classic rights-creating or the funds-
conditioning framework). 
 198. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285; see also Cenzon-DeCarlo, 2010 WL 169485, at *4 
(suggesting that the failure to conform to the structure of Titles VI and IX demonstrates 
Congress’s lack of intention to create a private right for individuals in the healthcare 
industry). 
 199. See Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (prohibiting discrimination against 
healthcare workers by entities receiving federal funds on the basis of the individual’s 
religious beliefs or moral convictions); 119 CONG. REC. 9603 (comments by Senator Javits) 
("I wish to make it clear that [the anti-discrimination provision] simply will protect anybody 
who works for that hospital against being fired or losing his hospital privileges . . . ."); id. 
(statement of Sen. Church) ("[I]f a physician who was part of a staff of a Catholic 
hospital . . . were to perform [sterilizations or abortions] . . . then he would not be 
discriminated against by the Catholic hospital for having performed those operations . . . ."). 
 200. Compare Title VI § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("No person in the United States shall, 
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance."), with Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions regarding abortion or 
sterilization against "any physician or other healthcare personnel" by any entity receiving 
federal funding). 
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federal funding.201  To conclude otherwise would be to blindly elevate form 
over substance. 
Adding force to the argument that Congress intended to create 
individual rights by passing the Church Amendment is the fact that 
§ 214(A) of the National Research Service Award Act of 1974, which 
amended the original language of the Church Amendment, bears the 
heading "Individual Rights."202  Although the Second Circuit acknowledged 
this evidence, it was ultimately dismissive, saying that "the title alone 
cannot confer individual rights; the most it could do is provide evidence of 
Congressional intent to confer them."203  The court properly noted that it is 
the Statutes at Large that provide the "legal evidence of laws" unless 
Congress has enacted a title of the United States Code itself as positive 
law.204  However, rather than acknowledge that Congress intended to create 
an individual right, the court focused on the lack of evidence that Congress 
intended to create a right of action.205  This approach is overly dismissive of 
the role that evidence of intent to create an individual right plays in the 
implication question.  Such evidence signals congressional intent to create a 
right of action,206 and its presence justifies an investigation into the statute’s 
contemporary legal context.  
Convincing the courts that the statute creates individual rights is a 
necessary but insufficient step in proving the propriety of a private right of 
action.  The Supreme Court has often noted that litigants must prove not 
merely the existence of a private right but must further prove that a private 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (detailing the similarities between the 
Church Amendment and Title VI). 
 202. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-348, § 214, 88 Stat. 
342, 353 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300 (2006)). 
 203. Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 697 (2d Cir. 2010).   
 204. See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 
(1993) ("[I]t is the Statutes at Large that provides the ‘legal evidence of laws,’ and despite its 
omission from the Code section 92 remains on the books if the Statutes at Large so 
dictates.").   
 205. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 626 F.3d at 697 ("While there may be some colorable 
evidence of intent to confer or recognize an individual right, there is no evidence that 
Congress intended to create a right of action."). 
 206. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288–89 (2001) (beginning the 
Court’s search for evidence of congressional intent to create a private right of action by 
considering whether there is evidence of congressional intent to create an individual right); 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979) ("First, the threshold question under Cort 
is whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a 
member."). 
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remedy was intended by Congress.207  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court 
has been somewhat inconsistent concerning what level and kind of proof is 
required to make this showing.208  Most recently, the Court has shown great 
reluctance to consider extra-textual evidence of congressional intent on this 
point, choosing rather to determine whether the text and structure give rise 
to the inference that a private right of action was intended.209  In Sandoval, 
the Court rejected the notion that contextual evidence could attain relevance 
independent from the text of the statute, saying that "legal context matters 
only to the extent it clarifies text."210  So what is needed is not an argument 
that circumvents the statutory text and structure in favor of purely 
contextual or policy arguments, rather, what is needed is a textual and 
structural demonstration of the need for a clarifying exploration into legal 
context. 
Contextual considerations are necessary in the case of the Church 
Amendment because the statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations.211  
The Church Amendment is unlike both Title VI and FERPA, the two 
statutory schemes considered in Gonzaga, in that it lacks provisions that 
specifically authorize the withholding of funds in the case of 
noncompliance.212  Of the three Senators that spoke concerning the 
possibility of withholding funds, two suggested that funds would not be 
withheld and the third expressed doubt as to whether the statute would be 
                                                                                                                 
 207. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 ("The judicial task is to interpret the statute 
Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private 
right but also a private remedy." (emphasis added)). 
 208. Compare Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975) ("[When] it is clear that federal law 
has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create 
a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be 
controlling."), with Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 (requiring litigants to put forth evidence that 
Congress affirmatively intended to create a private right of action). 
 209. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288 ("We therefore begin (and find that we can end) our 
search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of Title VI."). 
 210. Id. 
 211. See supra notes 194–201 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Church 
Amendment does not cleanly fit into the mold of either the "classic rights-creating" language 
of Title VI or the purely funds-conditioning language of statutes like FERPA). 
 212. Compare Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2006) (prohibiting 
discriminatory conduct but failing to specifically authorize the withholding of funds in the 
event of noncompliance), with Title VI § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 ("Compliance with any 
requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected by the termination of or refusal 
to grant or to continue assistance under such program . . . ."), and FERPA, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232(g)(a) (2006) (providing that "[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable 
program" which fails to conform to the statute’s privacy requirements). 
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construed in that way.213  Thus, there is considerable evidence that the 
provision was not meant to operate in a funds-conditioning manner.  If this 
conclusion is read in conjunction with the decision reached by the court in 
Cenzon-DeCarlo, we are left with a statute that facially prohibits 
discrimination but which allows neither private enforcement nor 
enforcement by means of conditioning the receipt of federal funding.214  
This cannot be.  It stretches the imagination to think that Congress intended 
the Church Amendment to be a purely advisory statute.215 
Because Congress’s intent cannot readily be distilled from the text and 
structure of the Amendment, this is an appropriate instance to turn to 
alternative means of determining intent.  One of the most often considered 
alternative sources of proof, suggested by Court precedent, is the 
contemporary legal context in which the law was passed.216  This approach 
acknowledges that Congress does not legislate in a vacuum but with an 
awareness of judicial practices in play at the time.217  At the time the 
                                                                                                                 
 213. See 119 CONG. REC. 9603 (1973) (statement of Sen. Church) (answering no to the 
question of whether funding would be denied to non-compliant hospitals); id. (statement of 
Senator Jackson) (same); id. (statement of Senator Javits) (answering the question as to 
whether there was a penalty by responding that he hoped there would be but did not know if 
it would be so construed in that way by the administrator). 
 214. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120(RJD), 2010 WL 
169485, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (concluding that there was no possibility of private 
enforcement under the Church Amendment); supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text 
(demonstrating that the Church Amendment does not explicitly authorize conditioning the 
receipt of federal funds on compliance); see also Rescission of the Bush Administration 
Conscience Regulation, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,207, 10,209 (proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88) ("No statutory provision requires the promulgation of rules to 
implement the requirements of the Church Amendments . . . ."). 
 215. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens:  The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 289, 306 (1995) ("By definition, a right must be enforceable.  What would be 
the measure of a right whose transgression carried no penalty?  It would look more like a 
hope, or a request, than a guarantee."). 
 216. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 
(1982) ("In determining whether a private cause of action is implicit in a federal statutory 
scheme . . . the initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the legislation was 
enacted."); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979) (considering the legal context 
in conjunction with the text and legislative history and thereby concluding that Congress 
intended for Title IX to be privately enforceable). 
 217. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698 ("In sum, it is not only appropriate but also realistic 
to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important precedents 
from this and other federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in 
conformity with them."); id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("We do not write on an 
entirely clean slate, however, and the Court’s opinion demonstrates that Congress . . . [had] 
good reason to think that the federal judiciary would undertake this task [of implying a right 
of action]."); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 313 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
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Church Amendment was passed, the federal courts were very active in 
implying rights of action.218  It was not until after the Church Amendment’s 
enactment in 1973 that the Court decided Cort v. Ash and introduced the 
more restrictive approach to implying remedies.219  Therefore, any 
determination of legislative intent regarding an implied right of action 
under the Church Amendment must take into account how that Congress 
understood the judicial approach to implication at the time.220  Because the 
courts routinely implied remedies in the period prior to Cort v. Ash, 
Congress’s silence concerning a remedy may well be the result of their 
reliance on the courts to fashion a suitable private remedy.221 
While a majority of the Court has recently expressed doubt as to the 
viability of such contextual considerations, this view that context provides 
an important tool for determining legislative intent garnered the support of 
four dissenting justices in Sandoval.222  Even the majority in Sandoval 
seems to concede that legal context is potentially relevant in a narrow class 
of cases.223  The Church Amendment is such a case where legal context 
attains this particular degree of relevance.  It is unreasonable to expect the 
Congress of 1973 to have explicitly considered the remedial effects of the 
Church Amendment when the courts had not yet indicated that such explicit 
consideration would be required to support a private remedy.224 
                                                                                                                 
("[The Court’s] unwillingness to even consider evidence as to the context in which Congress 
legislated is perplexing.  Congress does not legislate in a vacuum."). 
 218. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698 ("[D]uring the period between the enactment of Title 
VI in 1964 and the enactment of Title IX in 1972, this Court had consistently found implied 
remedies—often in cases much less clear than this."). 
 219. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 85 (1975) (declining to imply a private right of 
action under a federal criminal statute making it a crime for corporations to make 
contributions or expenditures in connection with Presidential elections). 
 220. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 889–90 (saying that courts interpreting the 
applicability of an implied right of action under an old statute must determine congressional 
intent with reference to how that Congress likely understood implication). 
 221. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 299–300 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (concluding that Congress, aware of the courts’ common practice of implying 
rights of action, expected that litigants "would have a remedy for any injury suffered by 
reason of a violation of the new federal statute"). 
 222. Compare Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288 ("[L]egal context matters only to the extent it 
clarifies text."), with id. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Assuming, as we must, that 
Congress was fully informed as to the state of the law, the contemporary context presents 
important evidence as to Congress’ intent—evidence the majority declines to consider."). 
 223. See id. at 288 (majority opinion) (indicating that legal context may serve a 
clarifying function in limited circumstances). 
 224. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 
(saying that the Court’s decision in Cannon, occurring six years after the passage of the 
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Other than context, there are several other factors that weigh in favor 
of finding a right of action under the Church Amendment.  For instance, the 
fact that the statute does not create any specific remedial scheme weighs in 
favor of an implied remedy.225  When Congress creates a comprehensive 
remedial scheme, the Court has treated that as an indication of 
congressional intent to deny a right of action.226  Thus, where Congress has 
not indicated a desire for the law to be enforced in another way, the 
argument for implication is strengthened.227 
Adding further support for a private remedy, the Obama administration 
recently rolled back a HHS regulation aimed at protecting the conscience 
rights of healthcare workers.228  At the end of the Bush Administration, 
HHS issued a regulation establishing a complaint procedure for individuals, 
like Cenzon-DeCarlo, who had faced discriminatory or coercive action by 
entities receiving HHS funding.229  Furthermore, the regulation required 
written certification by such entities that they would abide by federal law, 
including the Church Amendment.230  Less than three months after it was 
enacted, the Obama administration announced that it planned to rescind this 
ruling.231  In so doing, HHS expressed its belief that the Church 
                                                                                                                 
Church Amendment, had put Congress on notice that with respect to private remedies the 
"ball" was now "in its court"). 
 225. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting that the Church Amendment 
does not direct funds to be withheld from noncompliant entities); see also Church 
Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006) (containing no remedial provisions). 
 226. See Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., 489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989) ("It is also 
an ‘elemental canon’ of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a 
remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to provide additional remedies." (citations 
omitted)). 
 227. See Stabile, supra note 69, at 893–95 (suggesting that the lack of an explicit 
remedial framework weighs in favor of implying a right of action); see also Cort v. Ash, 422 
U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (articulating the factors that must be considered in deciding whether an 
implied remedy is appropriate including whether it is "consistent with the underlying 
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff"). 
 228. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) ("Once we identify the 
legislative purpose, we must then determine whether the creation by judicial interpretation of 
the implied cause of action asserted by Chris-Craft is necessary to effectuate Congress’ 
goals."). 
 229. See 45 C.F.R. § 88 (2008) (establishing a complaint and compliance certification 
procedure to ensure that federal funds do not support discriminatory or coercive actions 
towards individuals who refuse to perform services or research that they object to for 
religious, moral, or ethical reasons). 
 230. See id. § 88.5 (requiring recipients of Health and Human Services funding to file a 
Certificate of Compliance with the anti-discrimination provisions summarized in the HHS 
regulation). 
 231. See Rescission of the Bush Administration Conscience Regulation, 74 Fed. Reg. 
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Amendment did not require it to promulgate rules to implement the anti-
discrimination provisions.232  In February of 2011, HHS announced its final 
rule rescinding portions of the Bush Administration regulation.  The new 
rule cuts the compliance certification requirement and leaves only a 
complaint procedure through the Office for Civil Rights (OCR).233  Given 
OCR’s funding constraints and poor track record in the health care context, 
this complaint procedure likely offers only illusory hopes of meaningful 
recourse against discriminatory or coercive healthcare entities.234  The 
absence of an effective administrative procedure to enforce the terms of the 
Church Amendment further demonstrates that private enforcement is 
necessary to achieve Congress’s goal of protecting the conscience rights of 
healthcare workers.235 
                                                                                                                 
10,207, 10,210 (proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88) (announcing the 
planned rescission of the Bush administration anti-discrimination regulation which had 
established a complaint procedure and required recipients of HHS funds to certify their 
compliance with conscience-protecting statutes such as the Church Amendment).  A lawsuit 
is currently pending in the district of Connecticut in which Connecticut is seeking to 
invalidate the Bush era conscience regulation.  Complaint at 6, Connecticut v. United States, 
No. 3:09-cv-0054 (D. Conn. Jan. 15, 2009).  The case was put on hold to give HHS time to 
issue its final rulemaking, a rulemaking which could moot the case. 
 232. See Rescission of the Bush Administration Conscience Regulation, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
10,209 ("No statutory provision requires the promulgation of rules to implement the 
requirements of the Church Amendments . . . ."). 
 233. See Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience 
Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9,968, 9,976 (Feb. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
88) ("The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the Department of Health and Human Services is 
designated to receive complaints based on the Federal health care provider conscience 
protection statutes."). 
 234. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Community Lawyering:  An Approach to Addressing 
Inequalities in Access to Health Care for Poor, of Color and Immigrant Communities, 8 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 47 (2004–2005) ("OCR is severely under-funded and its 
limited resources make it an ineffective governmental agency, not only for enforcing Title 
VI but also for regulating our huge health care system."); Sara Rosenbaum & Joel 
Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System:  Reinvigorating the 
Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215, 230–32 (2003) (describing the failures of OCR and the 
obstacles to its effective investigation of civil rights complaints). 
 235. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the intent of 
Congress in drafting the Church Amendment was to protect individuals with a moral or 
religious opposition to participating in abortions or sterilizations from discrimination in the 
workplace). 
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VIII.  The Insufficiency of Other Possible Statutory Protections 
Despite the various arguments favoring the implication of a private 
remedy under the Church Amendment, it is far from certain that the courts 
will respond favorably by allowing private enforcement.  The most recent 
Supreme Court cases lend credence to Justice Stevens’s suggestion that the 
current Court has "distaste" for implied remedies in general.236  Due to the 
very real possibility that no private remedy will be implied under the 
Church Amendment and because of the great importance of the rights at 
stake in Cenzon-DeCarlo, it may be necessary for Congress to revisit this 
topic in order to make its purpose explicit.  While there are currently 
several federal laws that appear to forbid the kind of discriminatory 
behavior described in Cenzon-DeCarlo, these statutes also fail to provide a 
meaningful remedy to individuals like Mrs. Cenzon-DeCarlo who have 
faced discrimination and coercion at the hands of a federally funded 
hospital.237 
The strongest language concerning an individual’s conscience rights in 
the healthcare context comes from a provision of the National Research 
Service Award Act of 1974.238  The relevant provision states: 
No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance 
of any part of a health service program or research activity funded in 
whole or in part under a program administered by the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare [now Health and Human Services] if his 
performance or assistance in the performance of such part of such 
program or activity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral 
convictions.239 
Although this provision does not address discrimination, it provides 
meaningful protection from coercion to perform acts contrary to one’s 
religious beliefs or moral convictions.  Furthermore, this provision contains 
                                                                                                                 
 236. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 317 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(remarking that the Court’s unwillingness to expand the scope of the Title VI right of action 
is rooted in a "profound distaste for implied causes of action" generally). 
 237. See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 
§ 508(d)(1)–(2), 118 Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004) [hereinafter Weldon Amendment]; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 238n (2006) [hereinafter Coats Snowe Amendment]. 
 238. See National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 214(d), 
88 Stat. 342, 353 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2006)) (establishing 
restrictions on the use of human subjects in research projects and including a provision 
protecting individuals from requirements that they perform or assist in performing in any 
"health services program or research activity" against their moral or religious beliefs). 
 239. Id.  
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the "classic-rights creating language" that the courts have greatly favored in 
the implied right of action context.240  Therefore, a litigant falling under the 
scope of this statute would presumably face fewer obstacles in showing the 
propriety of a right of action.241  The difficulty with this provision will be in 
proving that the individual or the contested activity falls within the statute’s 
scope. 
This statute provides clear protection for an employee of a federally 
administered health service program or research activity.242  It is less clear, 
however, whether an employee of any institution that has received federal 
funding from HHS is brought within the protection of the statute or whether 
the individual must be working directly within a project specifically funded 
by HHS.  The indications given by the language, legislative history, and 
limited case law suggest that there must be a close nexus between the 
activity in question and the federal funding the institution has received.243  
There is considerable doubt, for instance, whether a hospital’s receipt of a 
grant for facility improvements would transform the entire hospital and all 
of its employees into participants of a "health services program" for the 
purposes of the statute.  However, an employee conducting research under a 
specified grant from HHS would present a clearer case for the statute’s 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Compare id. (providing that "[n]o individual shall be required to perform or assist 
in the performance . . . of such part of such program or activity [that] would be contrary to 
his religious beliefs or moral convictions" (emphasis added)), with Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 
(emphasis added)). 
 241. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002) (suggesting that a clear focus on 
the individuals protected, as in Titles VI and IX, gives rise to the inference that Congress 
intended to grant a private right on that class of persons). 
 242. See National Research Service Award Act of 1974 § 214(d) ("No individual shall 
be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a health service program or 
research activity funded in whole or in part under a program administered by the 
Secretary . . . ."); S. REP. NO. 93-381, at 23 (1973) (saying that the conscience provision 
"insures that no individual employed in a federally-funded health service program or 
research activity covered by the provisions of the Act shall be required to take part in any 
activity which would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral conviction" (emphasis 
added)). 
 243. See S. REP. NO. 93-381, at 24 (suggesting that the authoring committee had 
employees of federally funded health programs and research activities in mind); see also 
Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 590 (D.R.I. 1988) (rejecting a doctor’s claim that the 
statute protected his refusal to remove the feeding tube of a patient on the request of the 
family saying that the statute failed to reach the situation because the patient was not being 
treated "through a ‘health service program’"). 
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applicability since those activities could be classified as a "project" funded 
by HHS.244 
Notwithstanding the statute’s possible limitations, the absence of 
authoritative case law interpreting it suggests that it might be worth raising 
in cases like Cenzon-DeCarlo’s where employees of federally funded 
hospitals are required to perform activities against their religious or moral 
belief.  This is particularly true in cases where the patient or employee can 
be traced to particular federal funding.245  It is not clear whether the patient 
in Cenzon-DeCarlo was connected in that way to any particular federal 
funding.  Since this particular provision was not raised, it is unclear whether 
the court would have been willing to adopt a more expansive reading of the 
statute than the one taken earlier by the District of Rhode Island where it 
was required that the patient be receiving treatment directly under a federal 
health service program.246 
Finally, this statute is further limited in effect because it only reaches 
cases of coercion where individuals are required to perform or assist in an 
activity against their religious or moral beliefs.247  Because it reaches only 
these cases, its strong "rights-creating language" cannot be used to gain a 
private remedy in cases where individuals have been discriminated against 
because of their refusal to perform procedures against their religious or 
moral beliefs.  Thus, individuals with discrimination claims will still be 
forced to litigate the implication question under the Church Amendment in 
order to obtain a remedy.  The statute is nonetheless an important federal 
protection for individuals working under a federally funded project from 
requirements that force them to violate their own conscience.248 
                                                                                                                 
 244. See H. REP. NO. 93-1148, at 26 (Conf. Rep.) ("The Senate amendment contained 
provisions which [] would prohibit an individual from being required to perform services or 
research under projects funded by the Secretary . . . ." (emphasis added)). 
 245. See National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 214(d), 
88 Stat. 342, 353 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2006)) (requiring that the 
program or activity be funded "in whole or in part under a program administered by the 
Secretary"). 
 246. See Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 590 (rejecting a doctor’s claim of protection under 42 
U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) because the patient was not receiving treatment under a "health service 
program").  
 247. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2006) (protecting individuals working under federally 
funded health programs or research activities from requirements that they perform 
operations against their religious or moral beliefs). 
 248. See Irene Prior Loftus, I Have a Conscience Too:  The Plight of Medical 
Personnel Confronting the Right to Die, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 727 (1990) 
(suggesting that 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) might be effective in protecting the rights of 
healthcare workers in cases where the stipulated federal funds are involved). 
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Perhaps the most well known federal statutory provision related to the 
conscience rights of healthcare workers is the Weldon Amendment.249  This 
amendment prohibits the funding of any federal or state government or 
agency that subjects individuals or institutions to discrimination on the 
basis of a refusal to "provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer 
abortions."250  While it establishes an important principal that federal 
funding should not be extended to entities that discriminate against the 
conscience rights of healthcare workers, it does not directly address the 
discriminatory actions themselves.  Rather, Weldon is phrased in terms of a 
condition for the receipt of funding.251  Furthermore, this amendment is 
directed at discrimination by federal or state governments, programs, and 
agencies and, therefore, does not reach nongovernmental healthcare 
providers such as federally funded, private hospitals.252  Since the language 
of the statute is purely funds-conditioning and since the statute was passed 
long after the Supreme Court embraced a limited role in implying rights of 
action, there is far less justification for a private remedy under Weldon than 
under the Church Amendment.253 
The Coats-Snowe Amendment254 is another prominent federal 
statutory provision aimed at reducing discrimination towards entities that 
refuse to provide, cover, or refer abortions.  However, like the Weldon 
Amendment, Coats-Snowe does not reach discrimination carried out by 
nongovernmental hospitals, clinics, or research institutions receiving 
                                                                                                                 
 249. See Weldon Amendment, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(d)(1)–(2), 118 Stat. 2809, 
3163 (2004) (providing that no funds would be made available to state or federal agencies, 
programs, or government if it "subjects any institutional or individual healthcare entity to 
discrimination on the basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide 
coverage of, or refer for abortions"). 
 250. Id. § 508(d)(1).  
 251. See id. (conditioning the receipt of federal funds by saying "[n]one of the funds 
made available in this Act may be made available to a Federal agency or program . . ." that 
discriminates). 
 252. See id. § 508(d)(1)–(2) (applying conditions on the receipt of federal funds to 
government agencies and programs while making no mention of private institutions). 
 253. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002) (finding that the pure funds-
conditioning language of FERPA provided no suggestion that Congress intended to confer a 
right upon an identifiable class of individuals); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 
275, 289 (2001) ("Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals 
protected create ‘no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of 
persons.’" (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)). 
 254. See Coats Snowe Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2006) (providing that the federal 
government, as well as any state governments receiving federal financial assistance, may not 
discriminate against a health care entity on the basis of their refusal to train in, perform, or 
refer abortions). 
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federal funding.  By its terms, Coats-Snowe is directed at the federal, state, 
and local governments that receive federal financial assistance.255  This 
provision is then without effect in cases like Cenzon-DeCarlo where the 
discriminatory actions are carried out by a private hospital that receives 
federal funding.  Furthermore, even in a case where an individual faced 
discrimination at the hands of federal or state government because of their 
refusal to provide abortion services, Court precedent will likely foreclose 
private enforcement.  Although the possibility of a private right of action 
would turn on an application of § 1983, the Court’s decision in Gonzaga 
suggests that no privately enforceable right would be found under Coats-
Snowe.256 
Added to the lack of a federal judicial remedy for abortion-related 
coercion and discrimination is the apparent absence of administrative 
relief.257  The recent enactment and subsequent repeal of the compliance 
certification procedure has generated a great deal of uncertainty regarding 
the limits of conscience protections for healthcare workers.258  What is 
certain, however, is that this likely repeal leaves individuals who have faced 
such discrimination and coercion with no means of assuring that such 
events will not occur again in the future.  Furthermore, the back and forth of 
HHS demonstrates the inherent insufficiency of administrative remedies in 
the conscience context.  Because of the divisive nature of abortion related 
issues and the lack of clarity concerning Congress’s intended means of 
enforcing the Church Amendment, an administrative remedy will only be 
effective to the extent that each administration is committed to the 
protection of conscience rights. 
In the midst of the recent debate concerning healthcare reform, the 
issue of an individual’s right to be free from coercion and discrimination 
relating to their views on abortion once again came to the surface.259  
                                                                                                                 
 255. See id. ("The Federal Government, and any State or local government that receives 
Federal financial assistance, may not subject any health care entity to discrimination . . . ."). 
 256. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 (suggesting that the lack of Title VI and IX’s rights-
creating language creates a strong presumption against finding that Congress intended to 
create a right for an identifiable class of individuals). 
 257. See Rescission of the Bush Administration Conscience Regulation, 74 Fed. Reg. 
10,207, 10,209 (proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88) ("No statutory 
provision requires the promulgation of rules to implement the requirements of the Church 
Amendments . . . ."). 
 258. See supra notes 229–34 and accompanying text (detailing the enactment and 
repeal of the Bush administration conscience-protection regulation). 
 259. See 150 CONG. REC. S12,629 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2009) (amendment offered by Sen. 
Coburn) (proposing an amendment to the Senate Health Bill that prohibits discrimination by 
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Various provisions attempting to protect conscience rights were proposed 
and considered.260  The debate over healthcare presented yet another missed 
opportunity for Congress to fortify individual conscience protections.  One 
proposal by Senator Coburn echoed some of the language of the Church 
Amendment but went further by establishing a complaint procedure through 
the Office of Civil Rights.261  This proposal, as was the case with the others, 
was unsuccessful.262  However, the fact that such a provision would even be 
deemed necessary lends credence to the argument that the Church 
Amendment has failed to satisfy its essential purposes.  Furthermore, while 
a complaint procedure through OCR, like the one proposed by Senator 
Coburn, is better than nothing, still more is needed.263  Congress should 
seize this opportunity, with healthcare on the forefront of the American 
consciousness, to fortify conscience protections by empowering individuals 
to pursue their own remedies in federal court against federally funded 
entities that use coercive or discriminatory measures in an attempt to 
undermine the individual’s religious or moral objections to participation in 
abortion procedures. 
IX.  Conclusion 
The dismissal of Cenzon-DeCarlo’s claim, in conjunction with the 
enactment and subsequent rescission of the HHS regulation, casts an 
unacceptable level of doubt upon the extent of an individual’s conscience 
rights in the health care context.  Presently, it is unclear whether an 
individual who refuses to perform or assist in the performance of abortions 
has a legally enforceable right to be free from discrimination and coercion 
at the hands of institutions empowered by federal funding.  This state of 
                                                                                                                 
recipients of funding under the Act against individual health care providers or institutions on 
the basis that they refuse to provide, provide coverage for, or refer abortions). 
 260. See, e.g., id. (showing one example of a conscience provision being offered as an 
amendment to the health bill). 
 261. See id. ("The Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health and Human 
Services is designated to receive complaints of discrimination based on this section, and 
coordinate the investigation of such complaints."). 
 262. See id. (showing that Sen. Coburn’s proposed amendment that prohibited 
discrimination was tabled). 
 263. Cf. Melody Harris, Hitting ’Em Where It Hurts:  Using Title IX Litigation to Bring 
Gender Equity to Athletics, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 95 (1994) (discussing the failure of the 
Office of Civil Rights within the Department of Education to enforce the provisions of Title 
IX and the fact that OCR had never withdrawn funds from noncompliant educational 
institutions). 
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confusion leaves open the possibility that an individual could be without a 
defense against entities that force him or her to perform or assist in the 
performance of a procedure that fundamentally violates his or her 
conscientious, moral, or religious beliefs.  As was noted by one of the 
Senators who passed the Church amendment, such a notion "is repugnant to 
our political traditions."264  This principle that a person should not be 
compelled to violate their fervently held beliefs is reflected in numerous 
statutory provisions that prohibit such coercion and discrimination.265  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made clear that its decisions relating to 
abortion and contraception do not establish a constitutional right of access 
and that conscience clauses are appropriate means of protecting individuals 
and institutions who object to participation.266  However, to wait in hope 
that the Court will one day recognize the importance of a private right of 
action under the Church Amendment would be ill-advised.  In the 
meantime, a cloud of uncertainty, stirred up by the Cenzon-DeCarlo case, 
would loom in the minds of healthcare workers all across the United States.  
It is time, therefore, for Congress to move these various statutory provisions 
and statements of policy beyond the level of mere rhetoric by explicitly 
empowering individuals like Catherine Cenzon-DeCarlo to pursue a remedy 
against federally funded entities that employ discriminatory policies and 
practices against conscientious, religious, and moral objectors to 
participating in abortions. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 264. 119 CONG. REC. 9,601 (1973) (statement of Sen. Buckley). 
 265. See supra notes 43–53 and accompanying text (discussing the protections provided 
by the Church Amendment); supra notes 249–56 and accompanying text (addressing 
Congress’s attempt in passing the Coats-Snowe and Weldon Amendments to prevent 
discrimination against individuals who, for religious or moral reasons, refuse to perform, 
provide coverage for, or refer for elective abortions). 
 266. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of Conscience:  Moral Clashes over 
Deeply Divisive Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 54 (2008) ("[T]he U.S. 
Supreme Court on multiple occasions has made clear that Griswold and Roe established only 
negative rights to be free from government interference, not positive rights to the assistance 
of others."); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973) (suggesting that conscience clauses 
"afford appropriate protection to the individual and to denominational hospital"); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (explaining that the rights recognized in Roe related to the 
freedom from government interference but such a right does not require the government to 
remove "obstacles . . . not of its own creation"). 
